We study the impact of board reforms implemented in 40 countries worldwide on corporate dividend policy. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that firms pay higher dividends following the reforms. The increase in dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with weak board governance in the pre-reform period and those in countries with strong external governance mechanisms. Our findings corroborate the dividend outcome model, which postulates that board reforms strengthen the monitoring role of the board and empower outside shareholders to force management to disgorge dividends.

We propose an explanation for why corporate investment used to be sensitive to cash flow and why the sensitivity declined over time. The sensitivity stems from the informational role of cash flow in inferring the productivity of tangible capital in the old economy. Over time, however, more new-economy firms enter the market. These firms have reduced tangible capital productivity and reduced cash-flow predictability, which drives the decline in the average investment–cash flow sensitivity. Theoretical and empirical analyses support this explanation.

Using data on the universe of U.S. based mutual funds, we find that two out of five fund families hold corporate bonds of firms in which they also own an equity stake. We show that the greater the fraction of debt a fund family holds in a given firm, the greater its propensity to vote in line with the interests of firm debtholders at shareholder meetings, even when against Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendation. Voting has direct policy consequences as firms that receive more votes in favor of creditors make corporate decisions more in line with the interests of debtholders.

When activist shareholders file Schedule 13D filings, the average stock-price volatility drops by approximately 10%. Prior to filing days, volatility information is reflected in option prices. Using a comprehensive sample of trades by Schedule 13D filers that reveals on what days and in what markets they trade, we show that on days when activists accumulate shares, option-implied volatility decreases, implied volatility skew increases, and implied volatility time slope increases. The evidence is consistent with a theoretical model where it is common knowledge that informed trading occurs only in the stock market and market makers update option prices based on stock-price and order-flow dynamics.

This article explores some aspects of the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision on Nevsun Resources v Araya in the light of its exposition on the act of state doctrine and application of core human rights as an integral aspect of international customary law and common law. It examines the Nevsun decision in the context of recent statutory developments in France and the Netherlands, the promised law reform in the European Union, and the proposed business and human rights treaty. I argue that it is high time to abandon the doctrinal fossil that human rights obligations do not apply to corporate governance and operations. It is hoped that COVID-19 contexts, and a post-pandemic world, will expeditiously result in the willing adoption of a treaty on business and human rights.

Tables are a unique form of visualizing data because, unlike many charts, they are not usually intended to give a quick, visual representation of data. Instead, tables are useful when you want to show the exact values of your data or estimates. They are not the best solution if you want to show a lot of data or if you want to show the data in a compact space, but a well-designed table can help your reader find specific numbers and discover patterns and outliers. In this article, I present 10 guidelines for creating better, more effective tables; I then model these lessons by redesigning six tables from articles previously published in the Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis.