This paper examines the determinants of financial industry actors’ regulatory preferences—examining why some financial industry actors prefer less stringent financial regulations while others prefer more stringent regulations. The determination of preferences, we argue, can be understood as mutually dependent. How an organization is connected to other organisations through network ties may help to explain its regulatory preferences. Our empirical point of focus is financial industry lobbying in the context of the European Union (EU). Using data from nearly nine hundred lobbying letters related to legislation on banking, insurance, and securities regulation, we map out a “socialization network” that models connections between financial industry firms, their associations, as well as a broad range of other organisations and actors that are auxiliary to this community of organizations. Using these data we find evidence that organizations’ preferences are informed by their location within this socialization network. Controlling for a range of other plausible factors, we find that 1) those connected via common associational ties, 2) those closer to one another in the network and 3) those more “embedded” in this network are all less likely to diverge in terms of their preferences from one another.

We study the international innovation strategies of Australian and New Zealand (ANZ) firms in the European context, to explain their investment motives, knowledge flows and innovation performance. Our thematic analysis of seven case studies suggests that ANZ investors' motives for innovation in Europe are often both market- and knowledge-seeking and that some are also motivated by diversification and cooperation. While the strategic intent is often for the knowledge to flow in multiple directions among subsidiaries and headquarters (HQ), distance poses challenges to the efficiency of the process. European subsidiaries are often seen as potentially playing a key role in firms' global innovation systems, particularly with regards to radical innovation. However, because of distance and communication bottlenecks (e.g., time zone differences), HQ does not always recognise this potential. We develop a model proposing that HQ–subsidiary trust and strategic motives are moderators in the process of international knowledge connectivity and knowledge creation.

Despite much commentary in the media and the popular assumption that the banking industry exerts undue influence on government policy-making, the academic literature on the role of the banks since the 2008 financial crisis remains theoretically and empirically under-specified. In particular, we argue that different forms of financial power are often conflated, while favorable policy outcomes are too-readily assumed to be evidence of regulatory capture. In short, we still know relatively little about how bank influence varies over time and in different national contexts, the extent to which banking interests are unified or divided, and the conditions under which banks are capable of producing meaningful variation in policy outcomes. This article has three objectives: 1) to explain why the debate on bank influence matters; 2) to examine the evidence of bank influence since the international financial crisis; and 3) to set out a range of conceptual tools for thinking about bank power.

Training has shown little effectiveness in altering harassing or discriminatory behavior. Limitations of prior intervention efforts may reflect poor conceptualization of the problems involved, poor training intervention design, approaches that engender cynicism, or misunderstanding psychological principles of attitude and behavior change. Interventions should capitalize on behavioral science models and tools at multiple levels from a broad array of disciplines to explain harassment and bias, and then to defeat these behaviors. Measures to ensure fair treatment should focus on leadership socialization, organizational culture and climate, increased professional competence, and integration with organizational approaches to corporate social responsibility and performance.

Drawing upon two independent samples from mainland China, we propose and investigate the deterrence function of leadership behavior focused on control. We suggest that controlling leadership, specifically, authoritarian leadership, deters employees’ deviance under certain conditions. That is, authoritarian leadership thwarts employees’ interpersonal deviance behavior when leaders send clear signals of potential punishments of non-compliance by showing low leader benevolence, and when employees are highly dependent on the leaders for important work resources. Results from two independent studies largely support our key propositions. Overall, these results add to the range of possible impacts that a leader can play in decreasing employee deviance. Theoretical implications and directions for follow-up research are discussed.

We derive the optimal underwriting method and the quantitative initial public offering (IPO) pricing rule that this method implies in a market with informational frictions consisting of fully rational banks, issuers, and investors. In an efficient IPO market, an issuer’s expected initial return will be determined entirely by the combination of this pricing rule and issuer fundamentals. Applying this rule, we find that we can explain the quantitative magnitude of the principal aspects of the time-series and cross-sectional variation in IPO average initial returns. We conclude that the IPO market is efficient.

This paper focuses on the effects of entrepreneurial overconfidence at new venture creation. By analyzing Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data and using the theory of planned behavior as a framework, the study provides new evidence on the relative or absolute nature of overconfidence in entrepreneurial skills and the effect of overprecision on new venture creation. Overprecision of supporting beliefs is newly linked to venture creation and it is shown that nascent entrepreneurs’ overconfidence is based on a self-focusing attitude. The results confirm that overconfidence is not a single construct and highlights the differences between the forms of overconfidence habitually confused in the entrepreneurship literature.

This article assesses different approaches currently discussed and developed in international human rights and investment law to establish investor obligations. The article begins with a general framework of analysing and comparing these approaches. Next, attempts to include direct obligations of business entities in international human rights treaties are discussed. Despite earlier indications the recent initiative to create a legally binding instrument on business and human rights will most likely not include direct obligations for business entities. Subsequently, the article assesses the development of investor obligations in new international investment treaties and through the interpretation and application of existing international investment agreements. Arguably, the former will not lead to binding obligations in the foreseeable future and the latter rests on methodologically questionable grounds. Consequently, the article suggests that the way forward will require domestic legislation in host and home states to establish investor obligations which can be taken into account when interpreting existing investment treaty clauses requiring the investor to adhere to domestic law. This would reflect recent trends both in investment law reforms as well as the business and human rights movement.

Using survey data from China and India, we explore the impact of network strategy of new ventures in emerging markets. We focus on two critical dimensions of network strategy, namely, broadening and deepening the network and two types of knowledge: market knowledge and technological knowledge. We find that proactive network deepening is associated with market knowledge and network broadening with technological knowledge. From a network perspective, our work highlights the counterintuitive outcomes of breadth versus depth orientation in network strategy, highlighting differences between advanced and emerging economies. We use a post-hoc multi-group analysis to show the differences even within the two emerging markets: India and China. The direct effect of partnering proactiveness on market knowledge in India is significantly higher than that in China but there is no significant difference as to the effect of technological knowledge. We use this exploratory study to highlight the opportunities for network and entrepreneurship scholars to study emerging markets and, in particular, undertake comparative studies between new ventures in China and India.

After the subprime financial crisis, the countries who were worst affected set about reforming legacy financial regulations. Given multiple similarities in the way they experienced the crisis and the similar complexions of their post-crisis economies and politics, the contrast between the UK and the Netherlands' approaches to breaking up their largest banks presents a puzzle for prevailing theories in the politics of financial regulation. Both countries explored a range of reform options using similar expert committees, but while UK policymakers determined that commercial and investment operations should be ring-fenced in the largest British banks, the Dutch reform program centered on the banks’ own recommendations to change banking culture from the bottom up by developing a code of conduct and banker's oath. The paper traces this divergence to two related effects produced by the countries’ contrasting majoritarian and consensus party systems: power sharing and coalition formation. Under conditions of high issue salience, both worked to encourage British policymakers to prioritize reform, while in the Netherlands each factor reduced party political responsiveness and de-emphasized alternatives to the banks’ own reform prescriptions. The paper ultimately suggests that institutional democratic variables are worthy of greater recognition among scholars of business power and financial regulation.

Jim Tozzi is a legend and a treasure. Who better to reflect upon the history of, the significance of, and the prospects for centralized regulatory review (CRR)?

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Executive Office of the President coordinates the federal government’s regulatory agenda, reviews executive branch agencies’ draft regulations, and oversees government-wide information quality, peer review, privacy, and statistical policies. Remarkably, its regulatory oversight functions, and the benefit-cost framework underlying them, have not changed significantly through six very different presidential administrations. This article examines the evolution of executive regulatory oversight and analysis from the 1970s to today, exploring the reasons for its durability and whether the current imposition of a regulatory budget challenges the bipartisan nature of regulatory practice.