We examine whether political corruption impedes innovation. Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. firms, we find that corruption has a substantial, negative relation with the quantity and quality of innovation. These results are robust to using various fixed effects, proxies for corruption and innovation, and subsamples. To establish causality, we employ 2 instruments for corruption: local ethnic diversity and the corruption of the state a firm’s founder grew up in. Corruption appears to reduce innovation output both on average and for the most innovative firms. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the notion that corruption reduces social welfare by impeding innovation.

We document that firms’ financing decisions are affected by historical high prices. The ratio of the monthly high price to the 12-month historical high price positively affects the probability of a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Furthermore, the postannouncement market reaction is muted and the offering discount is smaller if the preannouncement stock price is high relative to its historical high price. The results suggest that historical high price reference points may help managers rationally time SEOs to take advantage of market reception and minimize issuance costs.

Many companies engage in dialogue with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) about societal issues. The question is what a regulative ideal for such dialogues should be. In the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR), the Habermasian notion of communicative action is often presented as a regulative ideal for stakeholder dialogue, implying that actors should aim at consensus and set strategic considerations aside. In this article, we argue that in many cases, communicative action is not a suitable regulative ideal for dialogue between companies and NGOs. We contend that there is often an adversarial element in the relation between companies and NGOs, and that an orientation towards consensus can be in tension with this adversarial relation. We develop an alternative approach to stakeholder dialogue called ‘agonistic deliberation.’ In this approach, conflict and strategic considerations play a legitimate and, up to a certain point, desirable role.

We develop a multi-country model with moral hazard and noise traders and show that investor sentiment should affect employment growth both domestically and abroad. Using a large sample of international industry-level data, we find strong support for the model’s predictions. We show that U.S. investor sentiment has a positive association with labor market conditions around the world, due to spillover effects as well as foreign direct investments from the United States. We also find that U.S. sentiment amplifies the negative effect of local financial crises on job losses, which supports the idea that financial development has a “dark side.”

Technological advances introduce the possibility that, in the future, firms will be able to use big-data analysis to discover and offer consumers their individual reservation price (i.e., the highest price each consumer would be willing to pay, given their preferences and available income). This can generate some interesting benefits, such as a better state of affairs in terms of equality of both welfare and resources, as well as increased social welfare. However, these benefits are countered by considerations of relational equality. This article takes up the market-failures approach as its basis to demonstrate what is wrong with using big data to personalize prices. The article offers an improvement to the market-failures approach and argues that what is wrong with using big data to personalize prices is that it unfairly undermines consumers’ ability to benefit from the market, which is the very point of having a market.

The U.S. regulatory response to the import of potentially contaminated food from Japan following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power facility meltdown has not been closely examined. The incident caused global concern about the safety of foods imported from Japan. U.S. scientists and policymakers conducted an initial evaluation of the potential health risks, analyzed information and data from foreign governments and international organizations, adopted an import alert, and conducted extensive monitoring. They did not detect radionuclides in, adopt a ban on, or advise consumers to alter their consumption of foods from Japan. Using a modified Global Simulation Model, National Marine Fisheries Service monthly seafood import data and United Nations trade data, we performed a comprehensive retrospective benefit-cost analysis of U.S. actions on U.S.-Japan trade in fish and seafood. We estimate that U.S. regulatory policy preserved approximately $150 million in annual consumer surplus from the continued import of Japanese fish and seafood (at a cost of less than $1 million for import sampling), while finding no additional exposure to harmful radionuclides. The lesson of our analysis is that investment in regulatory infrastructure has tangible economic benefits, and that retrospective benefit-cost analysis can be a useful framework for evaluating catastrophe risk-related policy strategies.

Twenty years ago Gibb suggested that despite an ‘explosion of research’ into enterprise, there had been ‘a growth of ignorance’. To see if that still applies, this paper looks at the nature of ‘knowledge’ and in particular at how our knowledge about enterprise has evolved. It suggests that to build our enterprise understanding, assumptions were made but not subsequently reviewed and verified. For instance it seems to have been assumed that enterprise is a sub-set of business, with the apparent consequence that big business-based thinking is applied also to small businesses.The paper concludes that there is a prima face case that ignorance about enterprise still prevails and there are examples which support this conclusion. In consequence, until the questionable assumptions are highlighted and their foundations recognised and corrected, we should not claim a leading role for our thinking or promote it as an appropriate basis for enterprise policy.