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46838 results in Management

Page 609 of 2342

  • What to lobby on? Explaining why large American firms lobby on the same or different issues

  • Niels Selling
  • Journal:
    Business and Politics / Volume 22 / Issue 3 / September 2020
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    18 November 2019, pp. 449-476

  • What determines whether or not firms lobby on the same policy issues? Scholars offer two broad answers to this question. Firms that are (1) similar or (2) connected through interorganizational ties target the same policy issues. In this article, I argue that the co-occurrence of these two conditions produces the opposite outcome, namely a tendency to lobby on different issues. This expectation draws on ideas from collective action theory and the literature on issue niches. From these, I derive the following assumptions: similar firms share political objectives and they should, when possible, act collectively by jointly delegating their lobbying activities. The reason for doing this is that it allows them to focus on their issue niches. However, the ability to delegate hinges on coordination and monitoring, which is facilitated by interorganizational relations. To test this proposition, I study the largest American corporations. The dependent variable is activity overlap, a measure of the extent to which firms lobby on the same issues. According to expectations, activity overlap is reduced when firms operate in the same industry and, simultaneously, enjoy favorable conditions for social interactions, such as a concentrated market structure. These results lend support to collective action theory.

Duality by Design
  • The Global Race to Build Africa's Infrastructure
  • Edited by Nuno Gil, Anne Stafford, Innocent Musonda
  • Published online:
    14 November 2019
    Print publication:
    28 November 2019
  • Africa's rapid population growth and urbanisation has made its socioeconomic development a global priority. But as China ramps up its assistance in bridging Africa's basic infrastructure gap to the detriment of institutions building, warnings of a debt trap have followed. Building upon an extensive body of evidence, the editors argue that developing institutions and infrastructure are two equally desirable but organisationally incompatible objectives. In conceptualising this duality by design, a new theoretical framework proposes better understanding of the differing approaches to development espoused by traditional agencies, such as the World Bank, and emergent Chinese agencies. This new framing moves the debate away from the fruitless search for a 'superior' form of organising, and instead suggests looking for complementarities in competing forms of organising for development. For students and researchers in international business, strategic and public management, and complex systems, as well as practitioners in international development and business in emergent markets.

  • JFQ volume 54 Issue 6 Cover and Back matter

  • Journal:
    Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis / Volume 54 / Issue 6 / December 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 November 2019, pp. b1-b9
    Print publication:
    December 2019
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  • JFQ volume 54 Issue 6 Cover and Front matter

  • Journal:
    Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis / Volume 54 / Issue 6 / December 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 November 2019, pp. f1-f6
    Print publication:
    December 2019
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  • IOP volume 12 issue 3 Cover and Back matter

  • Journal:
    Industrial and Organizational Psychology / Volume 12 / Issue 3 / September 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 November 2019, pp. b1-b2
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  • IOP volume 12 issue 3 Cover and Front matter

  • Journal:
    Industrial and Organizational Psychology / Volume 12 / Issue 3 / September 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 November 2019, pp. f1-f4
    • Article
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Page 609 of 2342