The past decade has seen a multiplication of theory and research on Open Innovation as a set of practices by which firms bring novel ideas to the market (Chesbrough, 2003; Gassmann et al., 2010). In the early stage of the work on Open Innovation, research was primarily driven by a focus on practical approaches and critically important insights into how firms went about exchanging knowledge and ideas with the outside world. Lately, however, studies of Open Innovation have benefited greatly from building on the knowledge-based theory of the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nonaka et al., 2006), which draws attention to the sources of innovation-relevant knowledge and the designs of mechanisms to tap and replenish such sources.

Recent years have seen increasing initiatives involving more open strategizing. These initiatives, referred to as Open Strategy, imply greater transparency and/or inclusiveness in strategy processes (Hautz et al., 2017; Whittington et al., 2011). As such, Open Strategy forms part of a larger societal trend toward greater degrees of openness in all domains of life – such as Open Innovation (Chesbrough, 2003), Open Source Software (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003), Open Government (Janssen et al., 2012), Open Data (Huijboom & van den Broek, 2011), and Open Science (David, 1998). By comparison with some of these domains, research on Open Strategy is still nascent. While substantial theoretical groundwork has been laid, and both qualitative and quantitative studies are now appearing, there remain significant opportunities for more research on what is a fast-developing and wide-ranging set of initiatives. Given this breadth, we identify the key dimensions, practices, and impacts of Open Strategy, and propose promising theoretical perspectives capable of building cumulative knowledge regarding these. We also guide researchers by offering a practical definition that sets boundaries on the phenomenon.

Open Strategy, both as a set of processes and practices, and as an emerging academic field, “promises increased transparency and inclusion regarding strategic issues, engaging both internal and external stakeholders” (Hautz et al., 2017: 298; see also Whittington et al., 2011). Open contexts, by involving greater transparency and inclusiveness, strongly impact the way multiple stakeholders make sense of strategy or, in other words, negotiate, disseminate, or even contest the issues at play in strategic change. The diversity that openness brings to the strategic table – a diversity of people (inclusion) but also of information and of perspectives (transparency) – offers organizations more possibilities to help them to make sense of their complex environment (Seidl & Werle, 2018). To uphold the dual promise of inclusion and transparency, Open Strategy would therefore benefit from sensemaking research’s attention to the detailed practices through which people form a shared understanding.

The platform economy enables socio-technical infrastructures that facilitate new forms of internet intermediation between buyers and external sellers. Several prominent and successful examples of such digital infrastructures depict themselves as a part of the so called “sharing economy”. We posit here that the key to understand the social structures of sharing economy platforms is to analyze them as digital marketplaces created and operated by market organizers. In this article we address these issues by approaching the problem of market order creation and the elements of market order as a question of the organization of markets by drawing on two exemplary cases, Lyft and Airbnb. We first consider efforts of market organizers to create new market orders on their digital marketplaces by mobilizing participants and resources. Second, we analyze what elements of organization these market organizers install to continuously operate their digital marketplaces. In all we show that although they use the rhetoric of sharing, internet platforms in the sharing economy generate enormous profits by establishing order on digital marketplaces using the five elements of organization.

In this chapter we discuss standards as forms of partial organization. Standards are defined as decided rules for common and voluntary use. Taking the example of CSR and corporate governance standards, we show that the degree of partiality of standards can vary widely – ranging from a single element of organization, i.e. decided rules, to all five elements of organization, i.e. decided rules, hierarchies, membership, monitoring and sanctioning. We demonstrate that in some cases partiality is the result of restrictions in the design of standards, while in other cases it is the result of an explicit choice. We also demonstrate that the degree of partiality of standards can change over time, as there are often pressures for standards to adopt additional organizational elements. Furthermore, we discuss the dispersed nature of many standards, showing how different actors often provide different organizational elements of standards without any central coordination. We close with an outline of an agenda for future research.

The modern world is highly organized. Much organization occurs within formal organizations, to the extent that the extensive study of formal organizations has overshadowed other forms of organization. But organization happens not only within, but also outside the context of formal organizations. We define ‘organization’ as a decided order, and we see some decisions as more fundamental than others and have dubbed these decisions ‘organizational elements’. We distinguish five such elements: membership, rules, monitoring, sanctions, and hierarchy. Individuals or organizations can use organizational elements to organize other individuals or organizations, even if they do not belong to the same organization. But organizers do not necessarily use all elements, and all settings are not organized by all elements. In fact, many social settings are only partially organized – even formal organizations. We use the concepts of social relationships and formal organization to specify what we mean by organization and organizational elements and compare organizational elements with other ways in which social relationships develop. We describe the differences between organization and other origins of social order such as institutions and networks. The chapter ends with an overview of the following chapters.

There are at least ninety-three academic journals devoted exclusively to ‘leadership’, in one context or another. At the time of writing, Google Scholar lists 244,000 articles and Amazon identifies over 100,000 books with ‘leadership’ in their titles – figures that must have been obsolete as soon as I typed them. Clearly, there is a fascination with the subject, fuelled by airport-bookshop business books and outlets such as Harvard Business Review, which seem convinced that all our problems can be solved if only the right leader is in place. Leaders are often depicted as some version of Superman – strong, confident, bold, decisive, empathic and visionary. Researchers identify an ever greater range of attributes and skills that all leaders should aspire to develop and which a select few are deemed to possess. Nor does there seem to be any cap on the number of consultants who promise to teach the skills that are said to be needed. CEOs and wannabe CEOs find much of this appealing. After all, it is more satisfying to believe that you are transforming the world rather than simply manipulating figures on a spreadsheet.

I moved to Australia from Northern Ireland in 1999, to work in one of the country’s leading business schools. Moving continents was a challenge. But it also involved relocating from the social science discipline of communication and into the new and unfamiliar world of management studies. In truth, both were nerve-shredding prospects. Yet this book has its origins in a conversation that took place during my time in Australia.

Markets and organizations are often contrasted with each other and are sometimes even treated as opposites. But they share at least one characteristic: They are both organized. Many markets have been created by organization, and virtually all markets are organized to a greater or lesser extent; for markets to function according to the normative ideals of economists, a high degree of organization is necessary. In this chapter, the organization of markets is contrasted to other ways by which markets are formed – mutual adaptation among sellers and buyers and institutions. Organization adds substantially to the uncertainty that has been seen as a typical trait of markets. The chapter describes how different combinations of organizational elements are used in different markets. In addition to sellers and buyers, there are two types of market organizers: ‘profiteers’, who organize in order to benefit their own business; and ‘others’, who claim that they organize for the benefit of other people or of everyone. Market organization is the basis for a form of democracy on the global level – a form other than that tied to a formal organization, such as a state.

This chapter develops definitions of the main concepts in this research monograph by drawing on extant literature and distinguishing corporate environmental sustainability as the strategies, actions and practices undertaken by a firm with regard to its interace with the natural environment from related concepts such as corporate philanthropy, impact investing, corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship and corporate greening. Definitions of patient capital, corporate governance, family firms, family versus non-family control and proactive environmental strrategy (PES) that constitute the core concepts in this monograph are developed.

The modern world is highly organized. Much organization occurs within formal organizations, to the extent that the extensive study of formal organizations has overshadowed other forms of organization. But organization happens not only within, but also outside the context of formal organizations. We define ‘organization’ as a decided order, and we see some decisions as more fundamental than others and have dubbed these decisions ‘organizational elements’. We distinguish five such elements: membership, rules, monitoring, sanctions, and hierarchy. Individuals or organizations can use organizational elements to organize other individuals or organizations, even if they do not belong to the same organization. But organizers do not necessarily use all elements, and all settings are not organized by all elements. In fact, many social settings are only partially organized – even formal organizations. We use the concepts of social relationships and formal organization to specify what we mean by organization and organizational elements and compare organizational elements with other ways in which social relationships develop. We describe the differences between organization and other origins of social order such as institutions and networks. The chapter ends with an overview of the following chapters.

The argument of this chapter is that brotherhood can be conceptualized as a partially organized relationship, based on membership and rules. To illustrate the conceptualization, the chapter draws examples from three different arenas where there is a strong rhetorical emphasis on brotherhood, or fraternity: the military, motorcycle clubs, and monasteries. Membership determines who is a brother or not and while the brotherly relationship sometimes extends beyond the cessation of membership in a formal organization, it presupposes membership at some point. Rules clarify important components of brotherhood including homogeneous relations among all brothers (or sisters). This makes a crucial difference relative to friendship, which is a type of relationship that can even be a threat for brotherhood. In areas where collectivist ideology, homogeneity of relationships, and requests on loyalty are especially forceful, personal or friendly relations between individual members cannot compensate for failure as a “brother.” Brotherhood justifies sacrifice of individual needs to collective demands, and this may include the sacrifice of a personal relation.

This chapter is divided into three sections. 1) Corporate governance (ownership and management) influences; the influence of institutional investors, activist shareholders, and board of directors; the influence of top management teams in non-family firms or the dominant coalition of family firms determines the temporal orientation of key decision makers and the extent to which these decision makers identify with the firm. 2) The firm's strategic responses to market forces and regulatory influences. The relationship between firms’ generic and sustainability strategies and the impact of these strategies on a firms’ financial performance. 3) The importance of organizational capabilities that enable firms to achieve a balance between their economic and environmental performance. Family firms in which the controlling owners strongly identify with their family business and share a vision of corporate sustainability and long-term stewardship, are more likely to develop organizational capabilities needed to undertake a PES. In turn, such family firms will more likely enjoy positive performance on financial as well as socioemotional dimensions important to their dominant coalition.

As I have argued frequently in this book, management research tends to neglect really important issues. It turns us into experts on trivial issues who explore unimportant relationships between insignificant variables. Researchers focus on either the blindingly obvious or the deservedly obscure. In Chapter 7, I discussed the extent of this problem in leadership studies. ‘Gaps’ that no one has ever noticed and no one cares about are ‘filled’. Much of this research, as I argued in Chapter 6, is written in impenetrable jargon and overloaded with references to the work of philosophers, preferably obscure ones, all to disguise the insignificance of what is going on. The authors of such work seem to revel in their inability to express themselves in the English language. Clarity, simplicity and meaning are mortal foes, to be put to the sword in every sentence.

Increasingly, organizations choose to develop their strategy collaboratively with other organizations, which is known as “interorganizational strategizing.” These new forms of collaboration are quite remarkable not least because they seem to go against much of the traditional strategy research (Barney, 2001), which puts a premium on inimitability. Interorganizational strategizing can be formally defined as engaging in a strategy process jointly with other organizations. This definition distinguishes interorganizational strategizing from other forms of collaboration that do not involve autonomous organizations. Interorganizational strategizing may be asymmetrical, with one organization explicitly taking the lead and asking other organizations to join its strategy process (e.g., Aten & Thomas, 2016), or symmetrical, with several organizations joining forces on a more or less equal basis (e.g., Teulier & Rouleau, 2013). Interorganizational strategizing also varies in its degree of formality. On the one end of the spectrum we have collaborations in the form of official workshops and meetings. On the other end we have informal discussions on strategy among strategists that meet for instance at a conference.