In this article, we evaluate the effect of managerial entrenchment on corporate information production using the voting outcomes of shareholder-initiated proposals intended to mitigate managerial entrenchment. We focus on the proposals that are passed or rejected by a small margin of votes, which generate plausibly exogenous variations in managerial entrenchment. We find that a reduction in managerial entrenchment enhances corporate information production. The effects are stronger for firms with greater information asymmetries and severer agency frictions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that reducing managerial entrenchment enhances corporate disclosure by aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders.

“Uncertain futures” refers to a set of policy problems that possess some combination of the following characteristics: (i) they potentially cause irreversible changes; (ii) they are widespread, so that policy responses may make sense only on a global scale; (iii) network effects are difficult to understand and may amplify (or moderate) consequences; (iv) time horizons are long; and (v) the likelihood of catastrophic outcomes is unknown or even unknowable. These characteristics tend to make uncertain futures intractable to market solutions because property rights are not clearly defined and essential information is unavailable. These same factors also pose challenges for benefit-cost analysis (BCA) and other traditional decision analysis tools. The diverse policy decisions confronting decision-makers today demand “dynamic BCA,” analytic frameworks that incorporate uncertainties and trade-offs across policy areas, recognizing that: perceptions of risks can be uninformed, misinformed, or inaccurate; risk characterization can suffer from ambiguity; and experts’ tendency to focus on one risk at a time may blind policymakers to important trade-offs. Dynamic BCA – which recognizes trade-offs, anticipates the need to learn from experience, and encourages learning – is essential for lowering the likelihoods and mitigating the consequences of uncertain futures while encouraging economic growth, reducing fragility, and increasing resilience.

Nuclear war is clearly a global catastrophic risk, but it is not an existential risk as is sometimes carelessly claimed. Unfortunately, the consequence and likelihood components of the risk of nuclear war are both highly uncertain. In particular, for nuclear wars that include targeting of multiple cities, nuclear winter may result in more fatalities across the globe than the better-understood effects of blast, prompt radiation, and fallout. Electromagnetic pulse effects, which could range from minor electrical disturbances to the complete collapse of the electric grid, are similarly highly uncertain. Nuclear war likelihood assessments are largely based on intuition, and they span the spectrum from zero to certainty. Notwithstanding these profound uncertainties, we must manage the risk of nuclear war with the knowledge we have. Benefit-cost analysis and other structured analytic methods applied to evaluate risk mitigation measures must acknowledge that we often do not even know whether many proposed approaches (e.g., reducing nuclear arsenals) will have a net positive or negative effect. Multidisciplinary studies are needed to better understand the consequences and likelihood of nuclear war and the complex relationship between these two components of risk, and to predict both the direction and magnitude of risk mitigation approaches.

Uncertain future risks pose cognitive and analytical challenges to household decision makers. Risks with uncertain probabilities, coupled with potentially severe outcomes pose problems for decision-making and are prone to overreactions. Imprecision in risk estimates generates behavioral distortions such as ambiguity aversion. This article presents new empirical results indicating household overvaluations of uncertain threats posed by several drinking water risks: traces of prescription drugs in drinking water, plastic water bottles with bisphenol-A, and the weed killer atrazine in drinking water. Negative reactions reflect responses to ambiguous risks, but policies driven by these concerns may misallocate regulatory resources due to risk conservatism and “no-regrets” responses.

Although cyber security has become widely recognized as a serious threat to our modern world, there are new threats to our security that combine cyber with other modes of “attack.” This article explores the increasingly important theme in homeland and national security that future attacks will be multimodal, in particular including both a cyber and a physical component, where the cyber attack is intended to make it easier to succeed in the physical attack, and is not an end in itself. The article describes sample scenarios of combined cyber and physical attacks in two sectors where even just cyber security efforts have lagged behind: sports stadiums and the maritime transportation system. It presents an approach to comparing the risk of a combined cyber followed by physical attack and that of a “traditional” physical attack on the same target. It then analyzes the different stadium and maritime examples from the point of view of this risk assessment approach.

Managing large-scale, geographically distributed, and long-term risks arising from diverse underlying causes – ranging from poverty to underinvestment in protecting against natural hazards or failures of sociotechnical, economic, and financial systems – poses formidable challenges for any theory of effective social decision-making. Participants may have different and rapidly evolving local information and goals, perceive different opportunities and urgencies for actions, and be differently aware of how their actions affect each other through side effects and externalities. Six decades ago, political economist Charles Lindblom viewed “rational-comprehensive decision-making” as utterly impracticable for such realistically complex situations. Instead, he advocated incremental learning and improvement, or “muddling through,” as both a positive and a normative theory of bureaucratic decision-making when costs and benefits are highly uncertain. But sparse, delayed, uncertain, and incomplete feedback undermines the effectiveness of collective learning while muddling through, even if all participant incentives are aligned; it is no panacea. We consider how recent insights from machine learning – especially, deep multiagent reinforcement learning – formalize aspects of muddling through and suggest principles for improving human organizational decision-making. Deep learning principles adapted for human use can not only help participants in different levels of government or control hierarchies manage some large-scale distributed risks, but also show how rational-comprehensive decision analysis and incremental learning and improvement can be reconciled and synthesized.

In 1948, the RAND Corporation, formed to connect military planning with research and development decisions, became an independent nonprofit organization. Before then, cost-effectiveness analysis, benefit-cost analysis, and systems analysis had no established home in the federal government. In the 1950s, under the leadership of Charles Hitch, Chief, RAND Economics, undertook a program of activities they called “systems analysis,” including evaluation of the costs and effectiveness of weapon systems. In 1961, Robert McNamara appointed Hitch to be the Comptroller of the Department of Defense and invited Hitch to carry out his vision he described as “Programming and Systems Analysis.” Programming became the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Five-Year Defense Program that linked strategies to forces to budgets. Systems Analysis assisted the Secretary to make choices of weapon systems and strategies. In 1965, Hitch returned to California and ultimately became President of the university. McNamara wanted Systems Analysis to report directly to him, and on his recommendation, President Lyndon Johnson appointed me Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis. In 1966, the President directed that all departments in the executive branch establish offices based on the Systems Analysis model. In 1967, Henry S. Rowen became President of the RAND Corporation. He broadened RAND’s scope beyond the military to include Health Services, education, urban problems including homelessness, ethics in scientific research, and climate research. In 1970, Rowen led the establishment of the Pardee RAND Graduate School, offering a doctoral degree in Public Policy Analysis to extend widely the application of the RAND Systems Analysis approach to many fields.

The value of the risk to life is a key element for benefit-cost analysis, enabling more rational public policy decisions in diverse areas as environmental, health, and crime. We value the risk to life in the context of crime using a discrete choice experiment (CE). The method has clear advantages in that it applies to the whole population and does not require vast data from labor markets, for example. Such data are not always available even in developed economies. Combining the stated preference approach with contingent valuation (CV), CE offer advantages yet to be explored in the context of crime. We demonstrate the application in a developing economy, where similar valuations are not available. The best estimate obtained for Argentina is an average of 1.5 million in 2015 US dollars per statistical life with a confidence interval ($1.1–$2.3). This result is consistent with estimates for the developed world, after appropriate transfer. We also analyze demographic factors in the risk to life, finding a positive influence of income, risk aversion, previous victimization experience and family size on the value of a statistical life, as well as a negative impact of individualism.

This article examines how small shareholders protected their interests from large shareholders’ expropriation by forming an alliance and taking collective action to block a convertible bonds issue by a Chinese bank that they considered harmful. Forming an alliance strengthened small shareholders’ network density, enhanced their salience (power, legitimacy, and urgency), and reduced the bank's centrality. This enabled small shareholders to change their strategy from being a subordinator to a compromiser and forced the controlling shareholders and their representatives to change their strategy from a commander to a compromiser. Apart from interest-based motives, the alliance provided small shareholders with identity-based incentives to persistently oppose expropriation by controlling shareholders. This article enriches the literature on small shareholder activism and principal-principal problem.

Based on positive organizational scholarship in healthcare, this study examined the relationships between four dimensions of employee perception of training: workplace stress, organizational outcomes, job performance, and turnover intentions. We hypothesized that employee training perception would have a negative relationship with workplace stress and that stress would mediate the relationship between employee training perception, job performance, and turnover intentions. We obtained data on 317 elderly-care workers in Northern Cyprus and analyzed it using structural equation modeling. Employee training perception was negatively related to workplace stress, and stress was negatively related to job performance and positively related to turnover intention. In line with Job Demand-Resource theory (JD-R), workplace stress partially mediated the relationship between employee training perception and organizational outcomes. The study contributes to the literature by confirming that elderly-care organizations that provide training opportunities for employees can reduce workplace stress, build organizational strengths, and facilitate positive outcomes.

Since 1917, tax filers in the United States who itemize tax deductions have been able to subtract gifts to eligible charities from their taxable income. The deduction is especially valuable to successful entrepreneurs who donate corporate stock. Such philanthropy was seen as a close substitute for government spending until after the mid-twentieth century. In the 1950s and 1960s, high tax rates catalyzed the formation of large foundations from industrial fortunes and precipitated a national debate about the legitimacy of such giving. The midcentury debate preceded increased oversight of charities and foundations and a shift in the way U.S. lawmakers regarded the contribution deduction—from a subsidy by philanthropists of public goods government would otherwise provide to an implicit public cost.

This article examines the Reynolds Metals Company’s political networking activities in Washington, D.C., and the state capitals of the U.S. South in the 1940s and 1950s. It argues that Reynolds’ astute recruitment of senior staff from federal and state governments, its adept building of elite networks in the legislative and executive branches, its judicious espousing of key political rhetoric (antitrust, regional development, national security), as well as its nurturing of Democratic circles in the South were crucial to their attainment of competitive advantage. This saw the company rise from being a new entrant in the U.S. primary aluminum production during World War II to the second-largest national producer by 1946 and a major global player by the mid-1950s. This same political networking was critical in maintaining that advantage after World War II in the face of competition from the Aluminum Company of America and the Canadian multinational Aluminium Company of Canada. Both “wartime” (covering the period from World War II and into the Cold War) and the legacy of government intervention (from the early twentieth century until the 1960s, including the New Deal) provided a fertile context for RMC’s business strategy. The company’s success owed much to founder Richard S. Reynolds Sr.’s acumen in hiring the right people, creating or joining the right networks, having the right social capital, as well as his experiences and connections accrued from working with his uncle, the noted tobacco magnate R. J. Reynolds. The article offers insights into the nature of U.S. business–government relations.

The distinction between what I call nonelective obligations and discretionary obligations, a distinction that focuses on one particular thread of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, helps us to identify the obligations that carry over from principals to agents. Clarity on this issue is necessary to identify the moral obligations within “shareholder primacy” (i.e., “shareholder theory”), which conceives of managers as agents of shareholders. My main claim is that the principal-agent relation requires agents to fulfill nonelective obligations, but it does not always require (and sometimes actually prohibits) discharging discretionary obligations. I show that the requirement to fulfill nonelective obligations is more far-reaching than has been acknowledged by most defenders and critics of shareholder primacy. But I also show that managers are not bound by certain discretionary obligations like charity, showing that their moral obligations are more circumscribed than the obligations that apply to human beings in general.