Openness is in vogue for a small but growing camp of governance reformers (Tihanyi et al., 2014; McGahan, 2015; Almirall et al., 2014; Kube et al., 2015; Mergel, 2015), and innovation scholars (Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Chesbrough & Bogers, 2014; Randhawa et al., 2016). Achieved through transparency and/or inclusion (Whittington et al., 2011), openness has recently become a recognizable theme in strategy literature (Birkinshaw, 2017; Alexy et al., 2018; Matzler et al., 2014a) and is implemented by strategy practitioners in profit-based (i.e., IBM) and nonprofit organizations (i.e., Wikimedia and Creative Commons).

It is, of course, impossible to separate the pressures on staff within business schools from the state of the universities in which they are based. I therefore start this chapter by paying tribute to the memory of an academic colleague in a different discipline, and who I never met. His name was Stefan Grimm and he died in 2014. The story of what happened to him is extreme, though perhaps less so than we would like to imagine. I think it serves as an illustration of university life at its worst and should alert us to the need for a change of direction.

Just by their names, the concepts of Open Strategy (OS) and Strategic Openness (SO) seem to have a lot in common – at the very least, they both constitute equally viable outcomes in a forced relationship technique exercise using the words “open” and “strategy.” Indeed, authors on both topics would arguably agree that both concepts somehow deal with behavior that has to do with strategy and in which certain aspects are open, with “open” implying at least a partial reduction of access restrictions (also see, e.g., OED Online, 2013). More precisely, Open Strategy is defined as an inclusive and transparent way to develop and enact strategy (Tavakoli et al., 2015), and Strategic Openness as how firms voluntarily forfeit control over their resources (Alexy et al., 2018).

Although the question whether organisation obstructs or supports social movement claims and mobilisation has long been debated, it is undeniable that some level of organisation exists in even the most radically horizontal social movements. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to how movements operate in dealing with the tensions associated with the question of organisation, that is, how they seek to be effective in decision-making while maintaining or advancing inclusivity and participation. This chapter presents an analysis of the organising efforts of a timebank. With a particular focus on the production of organisation, we illustrate how a group vested on the idea of horizontal, non-hierarchical collective action is dealing with the coordination and decision-making challenges they meet over time.

Practice theories have an obvious appeal for Open Strategy research. The major trend towards more openness in strategy making gives rise to new strategy practices that afford internal and external actors greater strategic transparency and/or inclusion (Whittington et al., 2011). Committing to the primacy of practice in social life (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki et al., 2001), practice theories offer a particularly suitable perspective for studying both the emergence of these new Open Strategy practices and the complex dynamics of their application in real-life settings. Accordingly, many studies on Open Strategy already refer to practice theories to identify the new practices associated with Open Strategy, such as strategy jamming, strategy blogging, or interorganizational strategy making.

The objective of this chapter is to explore the potential of the partial-organization concept as applied to the analysis of inter-firm networks as a form of economic governance that is created, reproduced or transformed with the help of network management practices. Key insights that the partial-organization perspective can provide into the process and the outcome of organizing and managing inter-firm networks are discussed. Inter-firm networks are conceived as partial organization of more or less complete formal organizations. Under specific circumstances, inter-firm networks could even be considered, at least in some aspects, as being even more organized than organizations. With regard to insights into the dynamics of this organizational form the chapter argues that the concept of partial organization helps to understand the development of this form from initial market relationships as well as from hierarchical organizations

This Handbook provides foundations for research on a phenomenon, going under many names, that is gripping more and more organizations: Open Strategy. There is a kind of revolution here. Whereas once strategy processes were reserved for senior managers and their immediate advisers, and strategy was highly confidential, now organizations are welcoming new and larger constituencies into strategy making and sharing unprecedented amounts of strategic information both internally and externally. Compared to the old conventions, Open Strategy promises radical advances in strategic inclusiveness and transparency (Whittington et al., 2011; Hautz et al., 2017).

Although the question whether organisation obstructs or supports social movement claims and mobilisation has long been debated, it is undeniable that some level of organisation exists in even the most radically horizontal social movements. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to how movements operate in dealing with the tensions associated with the question of organisation, that is, how they seek to be effective in decision-making while maintaining or advancing inclusivity and participation. This chapter presents an analysis of the organising efforts of a timebank. With a particular focus on the production of organisation, we illustrate how a group vested on the idea of horizontal, non-hierarchical collective action is dealing with the coordination and decision-making challenges they meet over time.

Markets and organizations are often contrasted with each other and are sometimes even treated as opposites. But they share at least one characteristic: They are both organized. Many markets have been created by organization, and virtually all markets are organized to a greater or lesser extent; for markets to function according to the normative ideals of economists, a high degree of organization is necessary. In this chapter, the organization of markets is contrasted to other ways by which markets are formed – mutual adaptation among sellers and buyers and institutions. Organization adds substantially to the uncertainty that has been seen as a typical trait of markets. The chapter describes how different combinations of organizational elements are used in different markets. In addition to sellers and buyers, there are two types of market organizers: ‘profiteers’, who organize in order to benefit their own business; and ‘others’, who claim that they organize for the benefit of other people or of everyone. Market organization is the basis for a form of democracy on the global level – a form other than that tied to a formal organization, such as a state.

In this chapter we discuss standards as forms of partial organization. Standards are defined as decided rules for common and voluntary use. Taking the example of CSR and corporate governance standards, we show that the degree of partiality of standards can vary widely – ranging from a single element of organization, i.e. decided rules, to all five elements of organization, i.e. decided rules, hierarchies, membership, monitoring and sanctioning. We demonstrate that in some cases partiality is the result of restrictions in the design of standards, while in other cases it is the result of an explicit choice. We also demonstrate that the degree of partiality of standards can change over time, as there are often pressures for standards to adopt additional organizational elements. Furthermore, we discuss the dispersed nature of many standards, showing how different actors often provide different organizational elements of standards without any central coordination. We close with an outline of an agenda for future research.

The formation of queues is an institution: it is created and managed largely by the emergent norms of those in the queue. Research on queues has demonstrated that it is more and more common for organizations to intervene in the ordering of queues. In this chapter we investigate why and how queues are organized and the tensions that arise when a strong institution becomes the subject of partial organization. As an institution, the idea of how to form a queue has strong legitimacy resting on commonly accepted values of equality and fairness. The fact that a queue is organized with one or several organizational elements does not necessarily mean that the queue as an institution is replaced by organization; on the contrary, organizational decisions may support the queue as an institution. In other cases, however, organization is a challenge to the legitimacy of the queue; instead it is the organization that uses its power to further its own interest in selecting the preferred customers from a larger number of people standing in a line. When an organization decides the order in which people are admitted, little remains of the institution of the queue.

The modern world is highly organized. Much organization occurs within formal organizations, to the extent that the extensive study of formal organizations has overshadowed other forms of organization. But organization happens not only within, but also outside the context of formal organizations. We define ‘organization’ as a decided order, and we see some decisions as more fundamental than others and have dubbed these decisions ‘organizational elements’. We distinguish five such elements: membership, rules, monitoring, sanctions, and hierarchy. Individuals or organizations can use organizational elements to organize other individuals or organizations, even if they do not belong to the same organization. But organizers do not necessarily use all elements, and all settings are not organized by all elements. In fact, many social settings are only partially organized – even formal organizations. We use the concepts of social relationships and formal organization to specify what we mean by organization and organizational elements, and compare organizational elements with other ways in which social relationships develop. We describe the differences between organization and other origins of social order such as institutions and networks. The chapter ends with an overview of the following chapters.

Two facets are all but universally present in current works on Open Strategy. First, while being aware of and addressing challenges and dilemmas associated with openness in strategy making (Hautz et al., 2017), increasing openness is mostly perceived as normatively good, as an ideal that should be achieved. Generally speaking, studies on openness in strategy making focus on different forms and degrees of collaboration with newly invited actors and on the potential benefits of Open Strategy by generating more and more suitable ideas (Whittington et al., 2011; Stieger et al., 2012; Aten & Thomas, 2016). Even when tensions and dilemmas of greater openness such as “compromising speed,” “undermining competitiveness,” or “burdening wider audiences with the pressures of strategy” (all taken from the overview in Hautz et al., 2017: 302) are discussed, these are considered limitations or hurdles to be overcome for achieving the desired greater openness.

Management studies is not in a unique position. Unfortunately, ‘questionable research practices’ (QRPs) and outright fraud are attracting increased attention across the physical sciences and social sciences, and also within the humanities.

In this chapter we argue that the key to an understanding of international governmental organizations (IGOs) is to conceptualize them not as standard forms of organizations with individuals as their members, but as meta-organizations comprising organized actors as members. Meta-organizations are paradoxical constructions: autonomous actors with autonomous actors as members. Organizational elements cannot be considered in isolation in meta-organizations; their combination are key factors; therefore meta-organizations are often partially organized. IGOs are permanently competing for actorhood with their member states and this competition has far-reaching implications for to what extent they can make use of all organizational elements. Using one element may require the avoidance of other elements or certain forms of decision-making. This helps to explain why IGOs have problems achieving co-ordinated organizational action and why they are less powerful actors than standard organizations are. Yet IGOs are strong in other respects. The most important organizational element in IGOs is membership. The strengths of IGOs can be understood in relation to their creation, their expansion, and their long-term influence on their members.

Practice theories have an obvious appeal for Open Strategy research. The major trend towards more openness in strategy making gives rise to new strategy practices that afford internal and external actors greater strategic transparency and/or inclusion (Whittington et al., 2011). Committing to the primacy of practice in social life (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki et al., 2001), practice theories offer a particularly suitable perspective for studying both the emergence of these new Open Strategy practices and the complex dynamics of their application in real-life settings. Accordingly, many studies on Open Strategy already refer to practice theories to identify the new practices associated with Open Strategy, such as strategy jamming, strategy blogging, or interorganizational strategy making.