Crime is an important outcome in many social policy evaluations. Benefits to society from preventing crime are based on avoiding victimization and freeing criminal justice system resources. For the latter, analysts need information about the marginal cost of policing for different types of crime across jurisdictions; however, this information is not readily available. This paper details key economic concepts relevant to law enforcement services, and then combines publicly available police expenditure data with insights from observational and time-diary studies to generate state-level, crime-specific, average variable cost estimates for crime-response services conducted by police by crime type. Since there is considerable uncertainty concerning various parameters underpinning these calculations, we use Monte Carlo simulation methods to incorporate the uncertainty into our estimates. This study finds that the U.S. population-weighted average variable cost of law enforcement response per police-reported Part 1 violent crime is $10,900, ranging from $6900 to $15,400 at the 10th and 90th percentiles, respectively. For a Part 1 property crime, the equivalent figure is $1300, with a range from $700 to $1700.

In this address I argue that different perspectives on the normative foundations of corporate responsibility reflect underlying disagreements about the ideal arrangement of tasks between market and state. I initially recommend that scholars look back to the “division of moral labor” inspired by John Rawls’ seminal work on distributive justice in order to rethink why, and to what extent, corporations take on responsibilities normally within the purview of government. I then examine how this notion is related to recent theoretical work in the field of business ethics. I thereafter turn to provide a brief outline of an alternative view that sees corporations as having responsibilities in so far as markets are sites of delegated oversight over the production of social goods that might otherwise be administered by the state.

We use proprietary transaction data on interest rate swaps to assess the effects of centralized trading, as mandated by Dodd–Frank, on market quality. Contracts with the most extensive centralized trading see liquidity metrics improve by between 12% and 19% relative to those of a control group. This is driven by a clear increase in competition between dealers, particularly in U.S. markets. Additionally, centralized trading has caused interdealer trading in EUR swap markets to migrate from the United States to Europe. This is consistent with swap dealers attempting to avoid being captured by the trade mandate in order to maintain market power.

This study provides an overview, categorization, and integration of what has been achieved in the niche of cross-culture experimental economics (CCEE) so far, aiming to inspire indigenous management researchers to extend their methodological toolbox by including experimental methods. As a result of the review, I find that most of the early studies lack depth and contextualization as well as detailed explanation about why human behavior differs. Hence, a better understanding about the influence of culture on economic decision-making is rather limited if it cannot be explained in more detail. In contrast, deep contextualization is a principle in indigenous management research (IMR). Both have so far not benefited from each other in the study of how culture affects human behavior, as both currently develop in parallel. Following the call for high-quality IMR (Tsui, 2004), this paper argues that an experimental methodology can make a contribution to IMR in the future by drawing on the strengths of both IMR (i.e., contextualization) and CCEE (i.e., methodology).

We show short selling in corporate bonds forecasts future bond returns. Short selling predicts bond returns where private information is more likely, in high-yield bonds, particularly after Lehman Brothers’ collapse of 2008. Short selling predicts returns following both high and low past bond returns. This, together with short selling increasing following past buying order imbalances, suggests short sellers trade against price pressures as well as trade on information. Short selling predicts bond returns both in the individual bonds that are shorted and in other bonds by the same issuer. Past stock returns and short selling in stocks predict bond returns but do not eliminate bond short selling predicting bond returns. Bond short selling does not predict the issuer’s stock returns. These results show bond short sellers contribute to efficient bond prices and that short sellers’ information flows from stocks to bonds but not from bonds to stocks.

Legislation that required the registration of firms’ anticompetitive agreements (cartel registers) to reveal, and sometimes regulate, anticompetitive behavior was relatively common in many nations before 1975. Examining the introduction of these registers in sixteen mostly OECD countries between 1920 and 2000 reveals which industries and sectors appeared to minimize successfully the impact of the legislation in their jurisdiction. We find considerable variation, but in most countries, the agriculture and export sectors were especially successful in avoiding or delaying the application of a register in their areas of interest.

By the start of the twentieth century, the two organizational forms most used by Dutch banks to raise capital through the dispersal of their ownership were the cooperative association and the public company. Share ownership in cooperatives was typically restricted to customers, while companies permitted outside investors. Neither organizational form dictated specific shareholder liability arrangements. New specialist banks targeting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) combined these two organizational forms and flexible liability rules to create hybrid forms. I find those that took the public company form were more likely to suffer distress during the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s. Liability arrangements for shareholders, by contrast, had a negligible impact on these banks’ resilience.

In the late nineteenth century, American shipyards started building modern metal ships, a sector dominated by the British. But, they faced a challenge: a shortage of domestic workers with the skills to fabricate large metal ships. Using census of population data, this article describes how one important U.S. shipyard, Newport News Shipbuilding, overcame the shortage of skilled domestic workers to assemble an effective labor force. The results show that skilled immigrants, mainly from Britain, played an important role in the shipyard's early life while, over time, native workers were trained to fill skilled occupations.