We analyze the impact of market frictions on the trading volume and liquidity premia of finite-maturity assets when investors differ in their trading needs. Our equilibrium model generates a clientele effect (frequently trading investors hold only short-term assets) and predicts i) a hump-shaped relation between trading volume and maturity, ii) lower trading volumes of older compared with younger assets, iii) an increasing liquidity term structure from ask prices, iv) a decreasing or U-shaped liquidity term structure from bid prices, and v) spillovers of liquidity from short-term to long-term maturities. Empirical tests for U.S. corporate bonds support our theoretical predictions.

This work is a contribution to the study of the adoption and use of computers in the savings bank industry in western Europe before the arrival of the Internet. It documents the presence of a pan-European network of IT users and analyzes the role of their industry associations in the processes of adopting and disseminating technology. It describes and analyzes their situation as late technology users, indicating certain specific and original patterns in the adoption of computers. Special attention is given to the implementation of shared computer centers throughout Europe and the results in the area of online accounting systems and teleprocessing systems as steps before the development of savings bank electronic funds transfer networks. It documents that in the savings banks industry, a reciprocal influence between technology and its uses was in play over long period of time and throughout the technological changes.

This article examines the financialization of the U.S. economy in the late twentieth century, with a focus on the role of industrial firms in the transition. This article explores how American industrial leaders’ reactions to the economic shocks of the 1970s influenced the rise of finance in the United States. Specifically, this article analyzes how the restrictive postwar financial regime gave way to a new liberal one, often represented by two vital shifts in the 1970s: the resurgence of global finance and the turn to austerity. It also demonstrates how leading industrialists’ preferences toward particular financial policies gave rise to different coalitions that affected policy orientation. It contributes to the financialization literature by clarifying the distinctive role of industrialists in American financialization. Furthermore, by situating financialization in the broader socioeconomic context, this article highlights the intersections of two important changes in the history of U.S. capitalism: financialization and the disintegration of the New Deal regime.

In 1968, facing a tumultuous banking environment, commercial bankers framed bank lobbying as the act of translating the complex U.S. financial and economic systems for legislators and regulators. Inspired by Science and Technology Studies research, this article demonstrates that the translations of the U.S. financial system offered by bank lobbyists were not merely descriptions of the complex banking system. Instead, their translations reflected a process that sought to create networks of congressional and public support and enroll other actors as spokespersons for these translations. The article details how the acceptance for these translations proved to be a long process of reformulations, reconfigurations, and failures. There were three primary lobbying strategies used by large U.S. commercial banks: maintaining close relationships with high-ranking decision makers, making public statements to gain public support for their translations of the economy, and advocating for long and expert studies with heavy bank consultation. The article also highlights the techniques used by bank lobbyists during this period to alter the banking environment: legislation drafting, editorial writing, letter writing, report writing, private consultations, meetings with reporters, and public statements. These lobbying techniques and strategies were instrumental in establishing the Hunt Commission and translating and actualizing the blueprint for financial “deregulation.”

This comment, in response to Phil Scranton’s article, suggests that communist business practices differ from those adopted in the West along three dimensions: (1) the locus and degree of centralization of production decisions, (2) the mechanism for coordinating the producers’ actions, and (3) the use of state terror in shaping the workers’ and the managers’ incentives. My analysis focuses on the third dimension—state terror, which I define as workers and managers experiencing extreme penalties for failing to meet the state’s goals. I argue that business history and allied disciplines of management and economics would benefit from studying state terror as a management practice and outline several avenues for pursuing such research.

This text is the author’s reply to reactions to “Managing Communist Enterprises” from three colleagues, Lee Vinsel, Natalya Vinokurova, and Pál Germuska. It includes reflections on his work process in researching capitalist and noncapitalist firms and sectors and the practical and theoretical bases for that work. In the course of replying to particular suggestions and critiques, the rejoinder also offers some considerations about the current and future course of business history as a discipline.

This comment attempts, first and foremost, to place Phil Scranton’s article within the overall trajectory of his career as a writer and historian. A common theme of that career has been complicating—or, as this comment puts it, “mucking up”—existing historical narratives. Finally, this comment suggests that Scranton’s role as complicator sometimes gives too little guidance for how his thoughts connect to existing literature, and it puts forward some possible avenues for future exploration that spring from Scranton’s examination of communist enterprise.

This comment challenges two main points of Phil Scranton’s article: his periodization, and the adequacy of the utilized sources. His interpretation neglects the efforts of the de-Stalinization attempts in Eastern European socialist countries during the mid-1950s, though these measures established all subsequent reforms. He based his argumentation on contemporaneous articles from the 1950s and 1960s while an expanding fresh literature is available on socialist economies, thanks to the large-scale declassification of formerly top-secret documents. However, his article is an extremely important contribution to the business history of communism and a delightful point of departure for many kinds of future research in this field.

Business history for three generations has focused almost exclusively on capitalist firms, their managers, and their relations with markets, states, and rivals. However, enterprises on all scales also operated within communist nations “building socialism” in the wake of World War II. This article represents a first-phase exploration of business practices in three Central European states as Stalinism gave way to cycles of reform and retrenchment in the 1960s. Focusing chiefly on industrial initiatives, the study asks: How did socialist enterprises work and change across the first postwar generation, given their distinctive principles and political/economic contexts, and implicitly, what contrasts with capitalist activities are worth considering.

After reading Jacobides, MacDuffie, and Tae (2016), the success of Tesla in launching a new automobile company in a crowded sector puzzled us. Jacobides, MacDuffie, and Tae (2016) had convinced us that developing the capabilities to become the manufacturer of a complete, safe automobile system would be quite difficult. Since the establishment of the dominant design for the auto in the 1920s, the industry has operated on the premise of massive economies of scale. Original equipment manufacturers’ (OEMs) role in taking responsibility for the legal liability of the whole automobile, combined with their extensive supply and marketing chains, has ensured they remained dominant in the sector despite some missteps with modularisation and outsourcing efforts (Jacobides, MacDuffie, & Tae, 2016; Schulze, MacDuffie, & Taube, 2015). No major component supplier has succeeded in forward integrating into becoming an OEM and no new entrants have challenged the dominance of the incumbent OEMs since the earliest days of the auto industry (Jacobides & MacDuffie, 2013).

We evaluate the link between chief executive officer (CEO) industry tournament incentives (ITIs) and the product-market benefits of corporate liquidity. We find that ITIs increase the level and marginal value of cash holdings. Furthermore, ITIs strengthen the relation between excess cash and market-share gains, especially for firms that face significant competitive threats. Additionally, for firms with excess cash, higher ITIs lead to increased research and development (R&D) expenses, capital expenditures, and spending on focused acquisitions as well as reduced payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that ITIs increase the value of cash by incentivizing CEOs to deploy cash strategically to capture its product-market benefits.