This paper identifies the individual components of social harm associated with a hypothetical racially targeted police encounter. Individuals who believe they are being targeted by police because they are members of a racial minority may suffer from fear of physical harm and humiliation by the encounter itself. However, the very fact that individuals will be racially targeted for a police encounter also causes harm to other members of the minority group even if they are not directly subject to an unwarranted encounter. In addition to fear and anxiety over the risk of such an encounter, they will often undertake costly avoidance behaviors to reduce their risk, or to mitigate the risk of any harm if such an encounter occurs. In addition, other members of society who value a nondiscriminatory policing policy might be willing to pay to reduce such unwarranted police encounters, and hence suffer a loss from this policing policy. In addition to discussing possible methodologies for estimating these cost components, this paper raises several issues that must be resolved – such as how to deal with the difference between perceived and actual racially targeted police encounters.

This article examines the controversial investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in recent mega-free trade agreement. Below, I examine the origins of the ISDS concept and outline the controversy surrounding its use in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Then, I provide a theoretical discussion that outlines both the exogenous and endogenous factors that contribute to the inclusion of ISDS provisions in international trade agreements. Focusing on the latter endogenous factors, I then argue that not all international trade agreements are the same and that, as such, it is possible to develop a typology of international trade agreement across two variables (the number of parties and relative power) that impact the appropriateness of including an ISDS provision. I test this typology against the empirical record. Finally, I discuss potential innovations to the ISDS provisions and market-based mechanisms that address the dual challenges of discrimination and expropriation that ISDS is designed to address.1

Executive Order (EO) 13771 on “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” introduces a new regulatory budgeting system in the U.S. federal rulemaking process. International experience suggests that the new rule, aimed both at reducing the number of regulations and the volume of regulatory costs, will focus on a subset of regulatory impacts, most certainly the direct costs imposed by regulation on businesses, or even a subset thereof. The paper discusses possible ways to make sense of the new rule, without undermining the soundness of benefit-cost analysis mandated by EO12866. The paper concludes that the new system, while potentially promoting more retrospective regulatory reviews, will risk fundamentally affecting the quality of regulation in the United States, generating frictions and inefficiencies throughout the administration, to the detriment of social welfare.

This paper looks at how to measure the tradeoffs in monetary terms that the public is prepared to make with respect to adoption of different community policing options. The approach advanced is a discrete choice experiment in which survey respondents face different policing options which can be described by a set of attributes ranging from costs to outcomes. The main contribution of this paper is to show how to go beyond the usual characterization of the monetized benefits of reducing the level of a specific type of crime to asking the question of whether those benefits differ depending on how that outcome is achieved.