In this article, I propose an account of episodic memory and episodic future-directed imagination for which I invent the term, ‘embodied constructivism’. Embodied constructivism, I claim, is a more sophisticated, enactivist version of Augustine of Hippo’s constructivist account of memory and expectation on which rest his epistemic claims concerning how God is known and remembered. However, embodied constructivism avoids metaphysical issues facing Augustine’s account by drawing on cutting-edge theories in philosophy of memory, studies in experimental psychology, and recent findings in cognitive neuroscience. Embodied constructivism is a synthesis of two contemporary theories of memory: an embodied theory of memory generation – specifically, autopoietic enactivism – with a constructivist model – specifically, simulationism. As embodied constructivism asserts, mentally travelling to the past to relive it in episodic memory and mentally travelling to the future to pre-live it in future-directed imagination are co-functional processes. In addition to preserving Augustine’s epistemic claims concerning how God is remembered and known, a further upshot of embodied constructivism is that it illustrates the importance of philosophy of science to theology in its reliance on a scientifically rigorous model of memory in defence of epistemological theology.

As Catholic churches played a tremendous role in the third wave of democratization, it is crucial to examine their role in the current trends of autocratization. Given the potential for democratic backsliding resulting from elections, I study the official stances of national Catholic churches toward electoral manipulation in 59 cases across different regions, post-Third Wave. I find that 32% of the Catholic churches resisted electoral manipulation, while 34% called for peace, and 34% took no stance. I argue that beyond religious market dynamics, historical context also shapes Catholic churches’ cost-benefit calculations. Using logistic and multinomial regression models, I contend that Catholic churches resist electoral manipulation when government favoritism toward Catholicism is too low, even when they control a considerable proportion of the population. Additionally, the historical pro-democratizing role of Catholic churches positively influences their decision to resist electoral manipulation, particularly for those facing high competition in the religious market.

This article takes up a philosophical examination of the Latter-day Saint theological conception of the eternal significance of sex. I first argue that the straightforward way of interpreting the theological claims about the eternal significance of sex appear to be incoherent. The main worry has to do with certain commitments Latter-day Saints take up with respect to the nature of disembodied spirits. Disembodied spirits don’t have bodies. As such they lack the characteristic features of embodied things. And sex is as bodily a feature as any we confront in the course of our lives. I will argue that these conceptual obstacles can be overcome by attending to distinctive aspects of the Latter-day Saint conception of divine creation. Doing so offers an interesting alternative way of conceptualizing the essences of premortal (disembodied) spirits. In particular, it motivates explicating their essences in terms of what Plantinga calls world-indexed properties. With the explication in hand, I show that not only are charges of incoherence avoided, but the new perspective gives a unified account of a variety of apparently disparate aspects of Latter-day Saint theology.

This article develops the problem of divine domination. Classical theism describes God as essentially all-powerful, sovereign, personal, omnipresent, and a se. If such a being exists, then he dominates humans in virtue of his essential properties. Since dominative relationships are unjust, the divine-human relationship is unjust. I reject solutions to this problem that appeal to humanity’s childlikeness or divine goodness, justice, or greatness. I conclude by gesturing towards what a solution to the problem might require.

If panpsychism is true then consciousness pervades the cosmos, and there exist many more conscious subjects than other worldviews contemplate. Panpsychism’s explanatory story about how human material composition and complexity grounds human consciousness seems to entail that there exist, notably, various conscious subjects within human organisms. Given the plausibility of the thesis that consciousness confers moral status – a thesis many panpsychists endorse – questions thus arise about the wellbeing of these inner subjects. In this article I raise the possibility that the lives of our inner subjects may not be morally suitable to a sophisticated centre of consciousness of the sort that likely exists, for example, inside various of our brain areas. Panpsychism, indeed, seems on the face of it to generate a good deal more suffering, in this way, than other worldviews. If that is correct, panpsychists who would embrace theism, and theists who would embrace panpsychism – for example pantheists – should be given serious pause. If panpsychism positively compounds the problem of evil, then one may have to choose between panpsychism and theism.