Nigeria is often portrayed as having a ‘Muslim north’ and a ‘Christian south’. Such representations oversimplify the complicated interrelationships between the two religious communities and their geographic locations. Similarly, while much has been written on the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region, there has been less scholarly attention to the philosophical and communal relationships between adherents of the two religions in northern Nigeria. I argue that there are parallels in the way in which Hausa-speaking Muslim artists responded to a censorship crisis in Kano State in 2007–11 and in the way in which Hausa-speaking Christian musicians from Nigeria’s north-east responded a few years later to the Boko Haram crisis. I examine Muslim filmmaker Hamisu Lamido Iyantama’s response to the Kano State Censorship Board, alongside Christian musician Saviour Y. Inuwa’s response to Boko Haram. Iyantama and Inuwa both counter repressive forces by expressing parallel understandings of their identities as citizens in the pluralistic state of Nigeria and as righteous members of universal religious communities that emphasize God’s justice in the end times. I argue that these Hausa-language artists present a vision of cosmopolitan unity across ethnicity and religion, as an alternative to the repressive forces of both state censorship and the anarchic violence of Boko Haram.

Nigerian Pentecostalism continues to assume many of the externalities of popular culture in the country, creating a unique composite of spirituality and secular entertainment. In an emergent trend, church leaders invite popular entertainers into church services and other church-related events with the declared aim of energizing their congregations. Where does the imperative in Nigerian Pentecostalism to outsource the work of inspiration to performers and jesters come from? What light does the embrace of Nigerian Pentecostalism and popular culture – the theological and the theatrical – throw on both these worlds? Triggered primarily by these questions, and mobilizing insights and analogies from the economics of religion, this article analyses strategies of evangelization enacted by Pentecostal leaders in a context of religious saturation. It is argued that, given the strictures of a changing religious marketplace, the unique convergence of spirituality and entertainment, as encapsulated by this trend, is a function of spiritual entrepreneurs’ need not just to retain the patronage of existing religious consumers but also to attract new ones. Licensed by the foundational liberalism of the Nigerian Yorùbá world, a Pentecostalism that is accepting of popular culture generates new spiritual and artistic forms.

This article examines how the schools of the Ibadi-Omani diaspora have had an impact on religious education and Afro-Arab relations in post-revolutionary Zanzibar. Much of the existing literature about Ibadism and the Omani diaspora in Zanzibar centres on the island’s economic history, stories of Arab elites under sultanate rule and the politics of the 1964 revolution. Little work explores how Ibadis in Zanzibar today distinguish themselves from other Muslims by marrying within the Omani community, running religious charities, wearing Omani clothing, attending Ibadi mosques, and enrolling their children in Ibadi schools. This research offers a fresh perspective on Ibadism and Oman–Zanzibar relations under neoliberalism through an examination of the lived experiences of Ibadis and non-Ibadis affiliated with the schools of the Istiqama Muslim community and organization.

While mobility-assistive devices ease movement and independence of persons with disabilities, their use may depend on their social and symbolic meaning. This article departs from our observation that elderly people in Wakiso in Uganda own a variety of assistive technologies yet do not utilize them all equally. Our findings are based on data collected through conversations, interviews and observations of thirty elderly people visited in their homes between July 2016 and January 2017. We found that elderly people with mobility disabilities valued devices for the greater autonomy they afforded, although dependence was also valued in some situations. The source or provenance of a device imbued it with meaning. Holding onto it regardless of how much one used it was in a way like holding onto the social relationship that the artefact represented, and the same can be said of abandoning it. Devices were also valued according to the manner in which they portrayed the user to the rest of the world – either positively as cosmopolitan and cared for, or negatively as sickly.

In moral careers of personhood and subjectivity of people who are mobility impaired, technologies such as mobility aids can become intertwined with teleologies of personal progress. This article examines how technologies shaped and expressed personal growth and social identity among those who took part in transnational trade between Kinshasa and Brazzaville. Engaging with a particular socio-technical environment facilitates both personal movement and cross-border mobility, and therefore becomes central to the ways in which individuals present themselves as ‘losing complexes’ – that is, their perceived frustrations about their disability. Exchanging a stick for a crutch or a hand-cranked tricycle for a wheelchair facilitates different forms of movement and expresses how one seeks to navigate between embarrassment, pride and respectability. Mobility aids thus serve as an index of different moments in moral careers of progress and decline, while their complementarity or incompatibility with public infrastructure is instrumental in creating and disaggregating social assemblages of disabled people. Through the rise and collapse of border trade between Kinshasa and Brazzaville, I discuss how crutches, cargo tricycles, wheelchairs and ferries shaped socialities and subjectivities over the long term. Considering the role of technology problematizes analyses of moral careers of personhood as attributed by others, drawing attention to personal agency and entanglement with a socio-technical environment.

In ‘Provisional notes on the postcolony’, Achille Mbembe argues that obscenity and grotesquery are essential characteristics of postcolonial regimes of domination and subordination. This article attempts to extend this insight for the study of contemporary African social formations. Drawing on examples from Central, Southern and West Africa, the article reflects on Mbembe’s particular emphasis on the carnality of power, especially power’s ability to (over-)carnalize social relations, by further demonstrating why this is useful for understanding the relations of domination and subordination in Africa.

The aim of this article is to initiate a new debate on vigilantism in Nigeria by arguing for a re-examination of the links between crime and vigilantism. It contends that, although the existing literature has shed considerable light on the practice of vigilantism in Nigeria, it has also obscured entire dimensions of the problem. By focusing exclusively on vigilante groups or ethnic militias, scholars have failed to anticipate the shift of the bulk of the violence from these social agencies to spontaneous mobs. After highlighting the factors that help explain the marginalization of ‘mob’ vigilantism in the scholarship about Nigerian vigilantism, I use ethnographic materials from my own field research in Lagos to show how crime – or more precisely unexplained crime – fuels intra-community distrust, which in turn fuels vigilante mobilization and violence as it increases the social control that crime-beset communities apply to some of their members who resent such distrust and consider it unfair. The data presented provide fresh insights into one of the most intriguing features of Nigeria vigilantism: the involvement of social delinquents at the roots of urban insecurity.

This article explores recent inter- and intra-religious entanglements and contestations between Sufi Muslims, members of the Izala and Christianity, which have emerged as a result of a new way of celebrating Mawlūd in the Nigerian city of Jos. Through the adept use of loudspeakers, Izala projects a sense of dominance over the public sphere of the city and uses this as a platform to critique the Sufis. In part as a response, and as a counter-critique of Izala, the Sufis have rejuvenated their Mawlūd celebrations as a mass public spectacle, involving the use of Christmas lights to decorate the city and the construction at the entrance to major streets of temporary wooden arches decorated with flowers, Christmas lights, wreaths and images of Shaykh Ibrahim Nyass. This article argues that the Sufis, who are at a disadvantage in the practice of organized preaching and the use of sound media, have transformed the Mawlūd celebrations into a mechanism to counterbalance Izala’s dominance of the public sphere and to reassert their presence in the city. The Sufis’ incorporation of decorative Christmas objects reveals the fluid boundaries between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, which sometimes generate dynamics of interreligious borrowing and mutual influence. This article attempts to remap and push the boundaries of studying Islam and Christianity in Nigeria, because focusing on one religion in isolation downplays the intertwining and intersection of practices between the two religious groups.

‘Yan haƙiƙa are a Sufi group that has come to prominence in the second decade of the twenty-first century in northern Nigeria, with a significant following in Kano. Although members of the group perceive themselves to be bona fide followers of the path of Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (Senegalese Islamic scholar and founder of Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya), they are considered by Sunni Muslims (both Salafis and Sufis) as a heretical faction. The basic ideology of this group is that Niasse Allah ne (Niasse is God); they also apotheosize their members. Their ideology stems from the concepts of Wahadat al-Wujud (oneness of being and unity of existence) and Tarbiyya (spiritual training), which is a method used by Sufi shaykhs to guide their disciples on the mystical journey to direct experiences of the Divine Essence – a method popularized by Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya. Initially, the group operated clandestinely, but in recent years its members have attracted public attention through Mawlid Baaye (celebrating the birthday of Niasse). During the celebration, they shower praises on Niasse and rank him above the Prophet Muhammad. Their comments generate violent reactions from Salafi and Sufi communities. While Salafis consider the creed of ‘Yan haƙiƙa as typical Sufi heresy, the Sufis not only disown them but also question their ‘Muslimness’. The emergence of ‘Yan haƙiƙa has changed the contours and composition of Tijaniyya in Kano because its defining ideology of deifying Niasse and its members contradict the teaching and doctrine of the mainstream Tijaniyya. This article unpacks the place of ‘Yan haƙiƙa in the highly contested and tense religious geography of Kano, exploring how its emergence complicates the category of ‘Muslim’ within mainstream Sunni Islam.

This article analyses an episode of public anxiety when, in late 2013, word spread throughout Kenya’s rural Lunga Lunga constituency that politically connected gangs called mumiani were abducting and killing children for their eyes, tongues and genitals. The rapid spread of these rumours coincided with a regional drought, parliamentary election campaigns, and the apparent discovery of ‘devil worship paraphernalia’ inside a shipping container at the nearby port of Mombasa. I analyse the 2013 mumiani scare in relation to histories of famine survival strategies, predatory patronage and occult speculation to argue that the 2013 mumiani panic condensed and expressed these histories in figural rather than temporal form. As ‘constellations’ of coastal Kenyan historical consciousness, mumiani are (and have long been) a key feature of, and at the same time iconic of, a broader critical discourse about the dark side of political largesse – ‘politics by night’.

This article aims to shed light on the institutions involved in spreading a ‘culture of rehabilitation’ and distributing devices (crutches, wheelchairs and protheses) in Tigray, where rehabilitation is strictly bound to the development agenda and to the ‘modernization’ of the country. Moreover, it questions the ways in which people, in practice, deal with such devices: in some cases, they are perceived as useful; in others, they are considered as something requiring a hard process of adjustment and marking a bodily difference. How is the ‘deviced’ body experienced? Are there some ‘techniques of the body’ that resist the biopolitical devices imposed by the culture of rehabilitation? I answer these questions through evidence collected during ethnographic fieldwork carried out between October 2014 and August 2015 in the regional state of Tigray, Ethiopia.

This article examines two northern Nigerian Muslim intellectuals – Aminu Sagagi and Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (enthroned as Emir Muhammadu Sanusi II of Kano, 2014–20) – whose approaches, in different ways, exemplify a self-consciously eclectic Islamic intellectual style. Their eclecticism breaks with categories familiar from the study of Islam in Africa and Nigeria, categories such as Sufis, Salafis and Islamists. The eclecticist style – or rather, styles – draw on northern Nigerian Islamic modernist traditions, the curriculum and atmosphere of Sudan’s International University of Africa (where both of these Nigerian intellectuals received degrees), and a wider set of global influences. Given their diverse intellectual formation, the eclecticists’ writings and careers allow for an examination of the translocal exchanges that have shaped what is sometimes perceived as a self-contained unit called ‘northern Nigeria’. The article further explores how the eclecticist style manifests in legal and political thought, analysing the critiques that Sagagi and Sanusi made of sharīʿa implementation in northern Nigerian states in the early 2000s. The article draws on Nigerian and Sudanese sources, as well as unpublished and published writings by Sagagi and Sanusi, to describe their intellectual trajectories and outlooks and offer a portrait of the eclecticist style.