Of all Woodrow Wilson's foreign policies, none is more deserving of criticism than his non-recognition policy. This policy, initiated by the President within a week after his accession to office on March 4, 1913, in response to the news of violent revolutionary disturbances in Mexico and Nicaragua, was primarily predicated on Wilson's assumption that the best way to prevent the recurrence of revolutions in Caribbean nations would be to warn all would-be revolutionists that they could expect no political or financial support from the United States. Ultimately he hoped that he could end the threat of revolution and induce all Latin American nations to abide by constitutional and democratic forms of government.

During the period of the French intervention in Mexico (1862-1867), the United States Secretary of State, William H. Seward, pursued a policy which historians have aptly termed “ cautious moderation ” and “ masterly inactivity.” Caught between the fear of French recognition of the Confederacy, or even a French-Confederate alliance, and outright war with France, Seward steered a middle course. The French government was informed that the United States disapproved of intervention in Mexico and that a monarchy established by external force held no promise of permanency. But this was done in such a way as to avoid the active antagonism of France toward a Union plagued by civil war. Although at no time was the Monroe doctrine invoked prior to 1865, these mild but consistent protests paved the way for a firmer policy toward France.

During the first half of the sixteenth century, the chroniclers of the Indies, those true chroniclers who were contemporaries of the conquest, wrote from personal acquaintance with the events which they were relating, as direct or indirect witnesses, relying upon their own experiences or upon the stories and versions of the other participants with whom they lived or whom their informers knew. But during the period which extends from the later years of the sixteenth century into the first decades of the seventeenth, those whom we would call the later chroniclers found themselves separated from the happenings which they were relating. For this reason they had to make use of different means. Further, this obliged them to depend on what their colleagues produced. They made use equally of the unpublished manuscripts of earlier historians as well as of works which were appearing at that time, either to follow them or to contradict them. From this arose the polemic atmosphere in which they had to work.

Bibliographies for the study of Brazilian history are either too brief, such as those in the appendices of general textbooks, or too long, such as the Manual Bibliográfico de Estudos Brasileiros. The present one aims to strike a happy medium and, by doing so, to provide a practical guide for the increasing number of students and of the general public in the United States who have an interest in learning more about the Brazilian past.

The selection of books for this bibliography has not been entirely arbitrary. Because it is intended primarily for North Americans, I chose liberally of the material available in English. Conversely, I was more exclusive in selecting works in other languages. Of the voluminous literature available in Portuguese, I sought to point out only the outstanding works—whether for quality of style, depth of research, originality, or at times, because they were the only examples of their kind in neglected aspects of Brazilian history. A few books of exceptional merit or interest in French and Spanish also were added. Doubtless I have included here some works which others may consider unworthy, to the exclusion of some they may consider indispensable. Still, I believe this bibliography will fulfill its primary purpose of indicating the basic material available to the student of Brazilian history.