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Active inference and free energy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2013

Karl Friston
Karl Friston*
Affiliation:
The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom. k.friston@ucl.ac.uk
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Abstract

Why do brains have so many connections? The principles exposed by Andy Clark provide answers to questions like this by appealing to the notion that brains distil causal regularities in the sensorium and embody them in models of their world. For example, connections embody the fact that causes have particular consequences. This commentary considers the imperatives for this form of embodiment.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 212 - 213
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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