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Two kinds of theory-laden cognitive processes: Distinguishing intransigence from dogmatism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2013

Elias L. Khalil
Elias L. Khalil*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia. elias.khalil@monash.edu www.eliaskhalil.com
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Abstract

The brain is involved in theory-laden cognitive processes. But there are two different theory-laden processes. In cases where the theory is based on facts, more facts can either falsify or confirm a theory. In cases where the theory is about the choice of a benchmark or a standard, more facts can only make a theory either more or less warranted.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 218 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

Khalil, E. L. (1989) Adam Smith and Albert Einstein: The aesthetic principle of truth. History of Economics Society Bulletin 11(2):222–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khalil, E. L. (2010) The Bayesian fallacy: Distinguishing internal motivations and religious beliefs from other beliefs. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 75(2):268–80. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.04.004.Google Scholar