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Unraveling the mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2013

Philip Gerrans
Philip Gerrans*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, North Terrace Campus, SA 5005, Australia. philip.gerrans@adelaide.edu.au http://philipgerrans.com
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Abstract

A radical interpretation of the predictive coding approach suggests that the mind is “seamless” – that is, that cancellation of error signals can propagate smoothly from highest to lowest levels of the control hierarchy, dissolving a distinction between belief and perception. Delusions of alien control provide a test case. Close examination suggests that while they are evidence of predictive coding within the cortex, they are not evidence for the seamless interpretation.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 214 - 215
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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