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Cultural evolution need not imply group selection

  • Dorsa Amir (a1), Matthew R. Jordan (a2) and David G. Rand (a2)

Richerson et al. make a compelling case for cultural evolution. In focusing on cultural group selection, however, they neglect important individual-level accounts of cultural evolution. While scientific discourse typically links cultural evolution to group selection and genetic evolution to individual selection, this association is due to historical accident only. We thus call for more consideration of individual-level cultural evolution.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
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  • EISSN: 1469-1825
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