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Do the folk need a meta-ethics?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Shivam Patel  and
Edouard Machery
Shivam Patel
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. smp119@pitt.edu http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/person/shivam-patel-0
Edouard Machery
Affiliation:
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, and Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. machery@pitt.edu http://www.edouardmachery.com
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Abstract

Stanford argues that cooperators achieve and maintain correlated interaction through the objectification of moral norms. We first challenge the moral/non-moral distinction that frames Stanford's discussion. We then argue that to the extent that norms are objectified (and we hold that they are at most objectified in a very thin sense), it is not for the sake of achieving correlated interaction.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e109
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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