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Foresight, function representation, and social intelligence in the great apes

  • Mathias Osvath (a1), Tomas Persson (a1) and Peter Gärdenfors (a1)

We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.

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M. Osvath (2010) Great ape foresight is looking great. Animal Cognition 13(5):177–81.

T. Suddendorf & M. Corballis (2009) How great is ape foresight? Animal Cognition 12:751–54.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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