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The dual nature of tools and their makeover

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2012

Antonio Rizzo
Antonio Rizzo
Affiliation:
Department of Communication Science, Università di Siena, Siena, 53100 Italy. rizzo@unisi.it http://rizzo.media.unisi.it
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Abstract

Vaesen argues that functional knowledge differentiates humans from non-human primates. However, the rationale he provides for this position is open to question – with respect to both the underlying theoretical assumptions and inferences drawn from certain empirical studies. Indeed, there is some recent empirical work that suggests that functional fixedness is not necessarily uniquely human. I also question the central role of stable function representations in Vaesen's account of tool production and use.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , August 2012 , pp. 239 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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