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Tool use as situated cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2012

Andy Blitzer
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. ajb89@georgetown.edu http://philosophy.georgetown.edu/people/graduatestudents/AndyBlitzer/ lbh24@georgetown.edu http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/lbh24/
Bryce Huebner
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. ajb89@georgetown.edu http://philosophy.georgetown.edu/people/graduatestudents/AndyBlitzer/ lbh24@georgetown.edu http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/lbh24/

Abstract

Vaesen disregards a plausible alternative to his position, and so fails to offer a compelling argument for unique cognitive mechanisms. We suggest an ecological alternative, according to which divergent relationships between organism and environment, not exotic neuroanatomy, are responsible for unique cognitive capacities. This approach is pertinent to claims about primate cognition; and on this basis, we argue that Vaesen's inference from unique skills to unique mechanisms is unwarranted.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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