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Scientific intuitions about the mind are wrong, misled by consciousness

  • Leonid Perlovsky (a1)


Logic is a fundamental reason why computational accounts of the mind have failed. Combinatorial complexity preventing computational accounts is equivalent to the Gödelian incompleteness of logic. The mind is not logical, but only logical states and processes in the mind are accessible to subjective consciousness. For this reason, intuitions of psychologists, cognitive scientists, and mathematicians modeling the mind are biased toward logic. This is also true about the changes proposed in After Phrenology (Anderson 2014).



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