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Scientific intuitions about the mind are wrong, misled by consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2016

Leonid Perlovsky
Leonid Perlovsky*
Affiliation:
Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Harvard University, Charlestown, MA 02129. lperl@rcn.com http://www.leonid-perlovsky.com/
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Abstract

Logic is a fundamental reason why computational accounts of the mind have failed. Combinatorial complexity preventing computational accounts is equivalent to the Gödelian incompleteness of logic. The mind is not logical, but only logical states and processes in the mind are accessible to subjective consciousness. For this reason, intuitions of psychologists, cognitive scientists, and mathematicians modeling the mind are biased toward logic. This is also true about the changes proposed in After Phrenology (Anderson 2014).

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e128
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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