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Reply to reviewers: Reuse, embodied interactivity, and the emerging paradigm shift in the human neurosciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2016

Michael L. Anderson
Michael L. Anderson*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17604-3003. michael.anderson@fandm.edu http://www.fandm.edu/michael-anderson
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Abstract

In this reply to reviewers, I argue that, although reforming the taxonomy of psychology will lead to great insights in the cognitive sciences, it will not result in 1:1 structure-function mappings in the brain; we should expect to see a great deal of irreducible functional diversity in the brain at multiple spatial scales. I further clarify both the promise and the limitations of the analytic techniques for capturing functional diversity and interrogating the taxonomy of psychology; describe the ways in which neural reuse can help us understand human development; further explore the ways in which my proposals for integrating psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology differ from the approach exemplified by contemporary evolutionary psychology; and lay out some new and hopefully interesting avenues for future research.

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Type
Author's Response
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e135
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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