Although disparities in political ideology are rooted partly in dispositional differences, Hibbing et al.'s analysis paints with an overly broad brush. Research on the personality correlates of liberal–conservative differences points not to global differences in negativity bias, but to differences in threat bias, probably emanating from differences in fearfulness. This distinction bears implications for etiological research and persuasion efforts.

I examine whether Wilson et al.'s argument for a science of positive intentional change constitutes an argument for a science of objective moral values. Drawing from their discussion, I present four reasons for thinking that it may be and some considerations on why it may not be. Concluding, I seek help from the authors.

I compare the collective behavior map proposed by Bentley et al. (“BOB” for short) with a similar “balance of pressures” (BOP) map proposed by MacCoun (2012). The BOB and BOP maps have important points of convergence, but also some differences. The comparison suggests that they are analogous to different map “projections” for maps of Earth – different ways of simplifying a complex reality.

Hebbian Learning should not be reduced to contiguity, as it detects contingency and causality. Hebbian Learning accounts of mirror neurons make predictions that differ from associative learning: Through Hebbian Learning, mirror neurons become dynamic networks that calculate predictions and prediction errors and relate to ideomotor theories. The social force of imitation is important for mirror neuron emergence and suggests canalization.

Many of the characteristics cited in Hibbing et al.'s account are ineffective predictors of economic conservatism. However, these same characteristics are often associated with differences not only in social conservatism but also in religiousness and authoritarianism. Hibbing et al. may have offered a useful explanation of traditionalism and attitudes toward change across domains rather than of general political attitudes.

Wilson et al. make the case for taking control of our future using evolutionary analysis. However, they are entirely silent on the ethical questions that must be addressed. This piece emphasizes this problem and notes that the relevant answers will require nontrivial analysis. This is where the humanities become relevant – in particular, philosophy and cultural anthropology.

The rational-decision approach is superior to the associative-learning approach of Cook et al. at explaining why mirror neurons fire or do not fire – even when the stimulus is the same. The rational-decision approach is superior because it starts with the analysis of the intention of the organism, that is, with the identification of the specific objective or goal that the organism is trying to maximize.

Bentley et al.'s scheme generates distributions characteristic of situations of high and low social influence on decisions and of high and low salience (“transparency”) of rewards. Another element of decisions that may influence the placement of a decision process in their map is the way in which individual decisions interact to determine the payoffs. This commentary discusses the role of Nash equilibria in game theory, focusing especially on coordination and anti-coordination games.

Bentley et al.’s two-dimensional conceptual map is complementary to cultural evolution research that has sought to explain population-level cultural dynamics in terms of individual-level behavioral processes. Here, I qualify their scheme by arguing that different social learning biases should be treated distinctly, and that the transparency of decisions is sometimes conflated with the actual underlying payoff structure of those decisions.

We argue that the political effects of negativity bias are narrower than Hibbing et al. suggest. Negativity bias reliably predicts social, but not economic, conservatism, and its political effects often vary across levels of political engagement. Thus the role of negativity bias in broad ideological conflict depends on the strategic packaging of economic and social attitudes by political elites.

We agree that evolutionary perspectives may help us organize many divergent realms of the science of human behavior. Nevertheless, an imperative to unite all social science under an evolutionary framework risks turning off researchers who have their own theoretical perspectives that can be informed by evolutionary theory without being exclusively defined by it. We propose a few considerations for scholars interested in joining the evolutionary and social sciences.

Ever since their discovery, mirror neurons have generated much interest and debate. A commonly held view of mirror neuron function is that they transform “visual information into knowledge,” thus enabling action understanding and non-verbal social communication between con-specifics (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). This functionality is thought to be so important that it has been argued that mirror neurons must be a result of selective pressure.

Recent studies provide convincing evidence that data on online information gathering, alongside massive real-world datasets, can give new insights into real-world collective decision making and can even anticipate future actions. We argue that Bentley et al.’s timely account should consider the full breadth, and, above all, the predictive power of big data.

The target article argues that developmental processes are key to understanding the mirror neuron system, yet neglects several bodies of developmental research that are informative for doing so. Infants' actions and action understanding are structured by goals, and the former lends structure to the latter. Evaluating the origins and functions of mirror neurons depends on integrating investigations of neural, social-cognitive and motor development.

Intentional change when viewed as making a risky or intertemporal choice with evolutionary relevance helps us understand its successes and its failures. To promote future-oriented ecological rationality requires establishing a linkage between nongenetic, cultural, and symbolic selections and genetic adaptations. Coupled with biophilic instinct, intentional conservation is more likely to prevail against evolved desires of environmental exploitation.

Hibbing et al. argue that the liberal–conservative continuum is (a) universal and (b) grounded in psychological differences in sensitivity to negative stimuli. Our commentary argues that both claims overlook the importance of context. We review evidence that the liberal–conservative continuum is far from universal and that ideological differences are contextually flexible rather than fixed.

While a timely conceptual innovation for the digital age, the “map” proposed by Bentley et al. would benefit from strengthening through the inclusion of a non–clock-time perspective. In this way, there could be new hypotheses developed which could be applied and tested relevant to more diverse societies, cultures, and individuals.

Negativity bias explains many ideological differences, yet does not explain research such as conservatives' greater life satisfaction. Conservatives live in safer communities, perhaps to escape negative emotions, yet display numerous other community preferences unrelated to negativity. This tendency toward cognitive consistency can explain both these phenomena and many of the phenomena described in the target article.

We thank the commentators for an extraordinarily diverse and constructive set of comments. Nearly all applaud our goal of sketching a unified science of change, even while raising substantive points that we look forward to addressing in our reply, which we group into the following categories: (1) What counts as evolutionary; (2) Ethical considerations; (3) Complexity; (4) Symbotypes, culture, and the future; (5) What intentional cultural change might look like; (6) An evolving science of cultural change; and (7) Who decides?

We argue, by analogy to the neural organization of the object recognition system, that demonstration of modulation of mirror neurons by associative learning does not imply absence of genetic adaptation. Innate connectivity defines the types of processes mirror neurons can participate in while allowing for extensive local plasticity. However, the proper function of these neurons remains to be worked out.