The “Gestalt Bubble” model of Lehar is not supported by the evidence offered. The author invalidly concludes that spatial properties in experience entail an explicit volumetric spatial representation in the brain. The article also exaggerates the extent to which phenomenology reveals a completely three-dimensional scene in perception.

Beyond what Colman is suggesting, some residual indeterminacy of Nash equilibrium may remain even after individual rationality is amended. Although alternative solution concepts can expand the positive scope (explanatory power) of game theory, they tend to reduce its accuracy of predictions (predictive power). Moreover, the appeal of alternative solutions may be context-specific, as illustrated by the Stackelberg solution.

The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?

In the context of Hurford's claim that “some feature of language structure maps onto a feature of primitive mental representations,” I will argue that Hurford's focus on 1-place predicates as the basis of the “mental representations of situations in the world” is problematic, particularly with respect to spatiotemporal events. A solution is proposed.

A rigorous cladistic analysis of the dorsal pallium of amniotes indicates that the stem amniote lacked sensorimotor areas. Reptiles apparently acquired a visual cortex by parcellation from the multimodal, hippocampal-like mediodorsal pallium of stem amniotes. The high number of sensory areas of the mammalian isocortex might derive from the specific properties it shows, such as growth-promoting influence on thalamic axons.

Instead of commenting directly on Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution, I provide some remarks from an interdisciplinary view. Language theory is examined from the perspective of the theory of complex systems. The gestural-vocal dichotomy, network theory, evolutionary mechanisms/algorithms, chaos theory, and constructive approach are briefly mentioned.

Byrne & Hilbert's thesis, that color be associated with reflectance-type, is questioned on the grounds that it is far from clear that the human visual system is able to determine a surface's reflectance-type with sufficient accuracy. In addition, a (friendly) suggestion is made as to how to amend the definition of reflectance-type in terms of CIE (Commission Internationale de l'Eclairage) coordinates under a canonical illuminant.

Considerations from an interaction-based approach to the evolution of language and the role of word-sentences therein show that the object-attribute ontology is arrived at a much later stage. Therefore, Hurford's arguments, by focusing on the predicate-argument structure, seem to miss out on most of the interesting aspects of the early stages in language evolution.

Lehar tries to build a computational theory that succeeds in offering the same computational model for both phenomenal experience and visual processing. However, the vision that Lehar has about isomorphism in Gestalttheorie as representational, is not adequate. The main limit of Lehar's model derives from this misunderstanding of the relation between phenomenal and physiological levels.

Where behavior defies economic analysis, one explanation is that individuals consider more than the immediate payoff. We present evidence that noneconomic factors influence behavior. Attractiveness influences offers in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. Facial resemblance, a cue of relatedness, increases trusting in a two-node trust game. Only by considering the range of possible influences will game-playing behavior be explained.

Jackendoff claims that current theories of generative grammar commit a “scientific mistake” by assuming that syntax is the sole source of linguistic organization (“syntactocentrism”). The claim is false, and furthermore, Jackendoff's solution to the alleged problem, the parallel architecture, creates a real problem that exists in no other theory of generative grammar.

An alteration in the developmental mechanisms that regulate telencephalic patterning or pallial growth may have led to an enlargement of the dorsal pallium during evolution, and to the origin of isocortex. Developmental mechanisms that may have produced a pallial enlargement, and the parallelism of this event with the enlargement of the dorsal thalamus during evolution are discussed.

The target article is an elegant synthesis of the developmental and functional data and views on the evolutionary origin of the mammalian isocortex, integrating results from cell and molecular biology, experimental neuroanatomy, and chemoarchitectonic studies. Complementarily, we give here an account of two modes of isocortical evolution (prosomere reshuffling and invention) in terms of costs of radiation and neural tissue.

The electrophysiological perspective presents an electrical field that is continuous throughout the body, with an intense focus of dynamically structured patterns at the cephalic end. That there is indeed an isomorphic mapping between the detailed holistic patterns in this field and in perception (at some level) seems certain. Temporal binding, however, may be a greater challenge than spatial binding.

Philosophical accounts of thought crucially involve an array of abilities to identify general properties or features of the world (corresponding to concepts) and objects that instantiate those general properties. Abilities of both types can be grounded in a naturalistic account of the usefulness of cognitive structures in adaptive behaviour. Language enhances these abilities by multiplying the experience bases giving rise to them and helping to overcome subjective biases.

Metamerism is a rather common feature of objects. The authors see it as problematic because they are concerned with a special case: metamerism in standard conditions. Such metamerism does not, however, pose a problem for color realists. There is an apparent problem in cases of metameric light sources, but to see such metamers as problematic is to fail to answer Berkeley's challenge.

Foundations of Language (Jackendoff 2002) sets out to reconcile generative accounts of language structure with psychological accounts of language processing. We argue that Jackendoff's “parallel architecture” is a particularly appropriate linguistic framework for the interactive alignment account of dialogue processing. It offers a helpful definition of linguistic levels of representation, it gives an interesting account of routine expressions, and it supports radical incrementality in processing.

Game theory poses problems for modeling rational belief, but it does not need a new theory of rationality. Experimental results that suggest otherwise often reveal difficulties in testing game theory, rather than mistakes or paradoxes. Even though the puzzles Colman discusses show no inadequacy in the standard theory of rationality, they show that improved models of belief are needed.

The Gestalt Bubble model describes a subjective phenomenal experience (what is seen) without taking into account the extraphenomenal constraints of perceptual experience (why it is seen as it is). If it intends to be an explanatory model, then it has to include either stimulus or neural constraints, or both.

There are 2,000 hair cells in the cochlea, but only three cones in the retina. This disparity can be understood in terms of the differences between the physical characteristics of the auditory signal (discrete excitations and resonances requiring many narrowly tuned receptors) and those of the visual signal (smooth daylight excitations and reflectances requiring only a few broadly tuned receptors). We argue that this match supports the physicalism of color and timbre.