In an attempt to provide a unified model of language-related mental processes, Jackendoff puts forward significant modifications to the generative architecture of the language faculty. While sympathetic to the overall objective of the book, my review points out that one aspect of the proposal – the status of the lexicon – lacks sufficient empirical support.

The predicate-argument approach, focused on perception, is compared with the ease-of-predication (or predicability) approach, focused on encyclopedic knowledge. The latter offers functional prediction and implementation in connectionist models. However, the two approaches characterise predicates in different ways. They thus resemble predicational cantilevers built out from opposite sides of cognition, with a gap that is yet to be bridged.

Structural similarity is helpful in recognizing homologous structures, but it does not define them. Such structures must also have phylogenetic continuity, a criterion that is ignored by Aboitiz et al. and by proponents of “field homology.” “Similar” structures, as well as “field homologues” from “the same” embryonic field, are not necessarily homologous, and an outgroup analysis of developmental stages should be performed to establish homologies.

Individualism fixes the unit of rational agency at the individual, creating problems exemplified in Hi-Lo and Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games. But instrumental evaluation of consequences does not require a fixed individual unit. Units of agency can overlap, and the question of which unit should operate arises. Assuming a fixed individual unit is hard to justify: It is natural, and can be rational, to act as part of a group rather than as an individual. More attention should be paid to how units of agency are formed and selected: Are the local processes local or nonlocal? Do they presuppose the ability to understand other minds?

Because our only access to color qualities is through their appearance, Byrne & Hilbert's insistence on a strict distinction between apparent colors and real colors leaves them without a principled way of determining when, if ever, we see colors as they really are.

Based on neuropsychological evidence of nonverbal impairment accompanying aphasia, I propose that the neural prerequisites for language acquisition are shared with a range of nonverbal capacities. Their commonality concerns the ability to recognize a limited number of finite elements in manifold perceptual entities and to combine them for constructing manifold entities.

Our understanding of paleoneurology can benefit through considerations of how ontogenetic patterns of skull suture ossification can limit the phylogenetic expansion of underlying brain tissue to specific regions. Additionally, the influence of biochemical, rather than biomechanical, mechanisms on skull suture morphogenesis enable a reconceptualization of the skull as an independent evolutionary system from the brain.

This comment makes four related points. First, explaining coordination is different from explaining cooperation. Second, solving the coordination problem is more important for the theory of games than solving the cooperation problem. Third, a version of the Principle of Coordination can be rationalized on individualistic grounds. Finally, psychological game theory should consider how players perceive their gaming situation.

Predicate logic has proved a very useful tool for the expression of theories of natural language semantics. Hurford's suggestion that predicate–argument structures mirror certain properties of the human sensorimotor architecture can be seen as an explanation of why this is so. Although I support this view, I think that the correspondences that Hurford draws between linguistic and sensorimotor structures not only involve natural language semantics, but include some elements of natural language syntax as well.

Lehar proposes an interesting theory of visual perception based on an explicit three-dimensional representation of the world existing in the observer's head. However, if we apply Occam's razor to this proposal, it is possible to contemplate far simpler representations of the world. Such representations have the advantage that they agree with findings in modern neuroscience.

Byrne & Hilbert understate the difficulties facing their version of color realism. We doubt that they can fix reflectance types and magnitudes in a way that does not invoke relations to perceivers. B&H's account, therefore, resembles the dispositional or ecological accounts that they dismiss. This is a good thing, for a dispositional account is promising if understood in an ecological framework.

According to Hurford, PREDICATE (x) is correlated with deictic object variables during event perception. This claim is inconsistent with some core literature on the perception of motion events. We point out that the perception of events involves the activation of the modal properties and amodal properties of underlying event structure, for which Hurford's target article fails to account.

Certain features of perception – the quale red, for example, and other qualia – must be regarded as additions to the materialist neurophysiological picture of perception. The perception of three-dimensional volumetric objects can also be seen as qualitative additions to the neurophysiological processes in the brain, possibly without additions to the information content.

In this commentary, I concentrate upon Ray Jackendoff's view of the proper foundations for semantics within the context of generative grammar. Jackendoff (2002) favors a form of internalism that he calls “conceptualism.” I argue that a retreat from realism to conceptualism is not only unwarranted, but even self-defeating, in that the issues that prompt his view will inevitably reappear if the latter is adopted.

Normative analysis in game-theoretic situations requires assumptions regarding players' expectations about their opponents. Although the assumptions entailed by the principle of common knowledge are often violated, available empirical evidence – including focal point selection and violations of backward induction – may still be explained by instrumentally rational agents operating under certain mental models of their opponents.

The overall dorsalizing effect proposed by the authors may be consistent with behavioral evidence showing that the dorsal cortex of reptiles functions like the hippocampal formation of mammals. It is suggested that the dorsal cortex of reptiles expanded in this dorsalizing process to become both entorhinal/subicular cortex and sensory neocortex.

The Gestalt Bubble model of visual consciousness is a courageous attempt to take the first-person perspective as primary in the study of consciousness. I have developed similar ideas as the Virtual Reality Metaphor of consciousness (Revonsuo 1995; 2000). I can, hence, only agree with Lehar about the general shape of a proper research strategy for the study of consciousness. As to the metaphysical basis of the research program, I have, however, several reservations about panexperientialism.

Colman's reformulation of rational theory is challenged in two ways. Analogy-making is suggested as a possible candidate for an underlying and unifying cognitive mechanism of decision-making, one which can explain some of the paradoxes of rationality. A broader framework is proposed in which rationality is considered as an emerging property of analogy-based behavior.

Jackendoff's criticisms of the current state of theorization in cognitive neuroscience are defused by recent work on the computational complementarity of the hippocampus and neocortex. Such considerations lead to a grounding of Jackendoff's processing model in the complementary methods of pattern analysis effected by independent component analysis (ICA) and principle component analysis (PCA).

The position that Aboitiz et al. have taken on the regions of the stem amniote brain from which neocortex arose, and on homologies among telencephalic pallial regions in mammals and sauropsids, is premature. Nonetheless, if their intent is to promote thought, discussion, and experimentation on this important topic, then their paper is valuable.