The essays in this volume are designed to throw light on the relations between two of the major novel and unique features of the current epoch of human history, features which distinguish the last quarter century from any other episode in the long record of man's efforts to deal with the problems of his society.

The Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) held the second part of its seventh ordinary session in Paris on December 11–15, 1961, under the presidency of Mr. Arthur Conte (French Socialist). In addition to discussing the state of European security, the Assembly debated questions concerning Berlin and the agricultural problems involved in the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community (EEC). The debate on agriculture was concerned with the implementation of recommendation 53, adopted in November 1960, in which the Assembly had called for negotiations for the accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC as a full member. Mr. Sicco Mansholt, vice-chairman of the EEC Commission, stated that if the United Kingdom entered the EEC, her agriculture would not have to overcome any exceptional difficulties which would justify a longer transition period than that of the six original members. He stated that this conclusion had been reached after a detailed comparison of relative prices and outputs in the United Kingdom and the six members of EEC. The Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution, presented by Mr. Hubert Leynen (Belgian Social Christian), calling upon the seven member governments of WEU to spare no effort to insure the success of the Brussels negotiations.

An analysis of UN coverage in sample years between 1948 and 1975 by five representative black U.S. newspapers as compared with the New York Times and, to a lesser extent, the Chicago Tribune shows that UN coverage by the black press since 1961 has declined, as it has for the white press, but that the decline in black press coverage is not only less sharp but has also been somewhat reversed in recent years. Patterns of coverage differ: greater priority is accorded in the black press to Africa and Asia and more emphasis is placed on personalities, especially on black Americans at the United Nations. Comparisons of black press coverage with UN “busyness” and with the differentials of support for the UN that have been manifested over the years in both black and white public opinion reveal no clear correlations.

The concept of a transnational system applies well to a study of labor in North America. For one thing, the chief characteristics of the labor market and of the institutions, procedures, and practices of labor relations are broadly similar in Canada and the United States as compared with other parts of the world. Although such similarities are not alone sufficient to suggest a system, there is also a persistent structure of relationships and interactions in labor matters extending across the boundary between the two countries. American investment in Canada and the so-called international unions are at the heart of this structure of relationships. Other segments of labor, whether organized in trade unions or unorganized, are connected with the heart of this transnational system through the continental flow of economic transactions.

A Point of departure for considering the evolution of t!he judicial function in the United Nations system can be found in three interrelated decisions of principle incorporated in the UN Charter itself, of which the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) forms an integral part.

The Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its regular semiannual ministerial meeting at Ottawa on May 22–24, 1963. According to the communique released at the end of the meeting, the Ministers emphasized that the enduring character of the North Atlantic alliance, founded on the principles of interdependence and common defense, constituted a basic guarantee for the maintenance of peace.

The General Assembly held its fifth emergency special session at the request of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the concurrence of a majority of Member States. The session comprised the 1525th–1558th plenary meetings, held between July 4 and 21, 1967, with a final meeting, the 1559th, held on September 18, 1967. Abdul Rahman Pazhwak (Afghanistan), President of the 21st session of the General Assembly, presided over the emergency session

The tenth Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO), held in Geneva from May 7 to 24, 1957, was attended by the delegates of 79 member and associate member states. After unanimously electing Dr. S. Al-Wahbi (Iraq) president, the Assembly adopted the report of the Committee on Credentials by 58 votes to o with 5 abstentions.

Why do some economic shocks have political consequences, upturning elections and ushering in radical candidates, while others are brushed off as structural change? We address this puzzle by looking to geographically concentrated industries, and how they relate to regional identity. While most often presented as a source of regional strength, we show that industrial hubs in the United States have accounted for more job losses than gains over the last twenty years. We then show how this matters through three original survey studies. Workers in geographically concentrated industries belong to denser, more deeply-rooted peer networks; these are associated with a stronger view that politicians are responsible for preventing layoffs. Those same individuals also perceive economic shocks of equal magnitude as more damaging to their region’s standing, compared to the rest of the country. Perceptions of lost regional standing, in turn, are associated with greater demand for populist leadership traits. Finally, we show how these individual attitudes translate into aggregate political behavior. Employment losses in industrial hubs are tied to greater support for Republican candidates, while equivalent losses in non-hubs show no analogous effect. Our account presents a competing picture to the dominant narrative of industrial hubs as founts of innovation and productivity. When threatened by structural forces, such hubs can turn instead into founts of political resentment.

The first meeting of the twelve French-speaking African states which subsequently became known as the “Brazzaville group”—Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta—was held at Abidjan in the Ivory Coast in October 1960. The meeting was organized by President Félix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast for the purpose of discussing whether the independent African states could mediate or in some other way help bring the Algerian conflict to an end without alienating France. The final communiqué stated that the conference had examined the Algerian, Congolese, and Mauritanian questions, that all the countries attending would support Mauritania's application for membership in the UN, and that further meetings would be held.

The behavior of the Afro-Asian states on the Hungarian Question has been cited as an outstanding example of the discrepancy that exists between their moralistic pronouncements on international conduct and their true actions. It has also served to strengthen the view that they forma cohesive unit which is unduly solicitous of Soviet interests.

This article examines the United States-Canadian defense issue area from a transnational and transgovernmental perspective, and attempts to develop conceptually the transgovernmental dimension through empirical application. The first part delineates those factors that encourage transnational and transgovernmental activity in the defense issue area. The second part considers pure intergovernmental transactions, referring to United States-Canadian dealings in which there is no transnational or transgovernmental activity. Because we know so little about how these dealings occur, this section examines pure intergovernmental transactions as a three-stage issue flow: preprocess, process, and postprocess. The third section identifies and examines the dynamics of mixed transactions, referring to intergovernmental flows having transnational or transgovernmental activity that does not essentially alter the outcomes of the flows. The fourth part identifies transformative transactions, referring to intergovernmental flows that become transnational or transgovernmental flows (or the reverse) through the involvement of new actors that significantly alter the outcomes of the flows. In summation, the fifth section considers those factors militating against transnational and transgovernmental activity in the defense area.

I. The Rationale of the Veto

At the time of San Francisco, and intermittently since, five separate but interrelated arguments have been advanced to support the veto privilege: I) that the terms of Article 27 (3) of the Charter, by requiring big power negotiations before a vote is taken, in fact guarantee preservation of international peace; 2) that, since big powers cannot and will not submit to being voted into a war by small and medium states, the chain of events theory is valid and a big power should be permitted to exercise a veto on a subject which might eventually lead to enforcement action by the United Nations; 3) that the veto acts as a kind of safety valve preserving the status quo and preventing controversial changes which might cause conflict among the Big Five; 4) that the veto enables states in a minority position to protect their vital interests against infringement by the majority; and finally, 5) that the veto has, in fact, been used as a bargaining weapon by small states or by a minority.

This essay argues that the United States’ expansive use of financial sanctions—leveraging dollar-clearing chokepoints and global networks—has paradoxically accelerated pressures toward the erosion of the liberal economic order. As sanctions proliferate, targets move from short-term evasion to building alternative infrastructures, such as China’s RMB settlement system (CIPS), BRICS financial mechanisms, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), and barter-based trade, thereby fostering governance decoupling from US-led systems. Drawing on structural power and institutionalist insights, I show how sanctions catalyze parallel economic ecosystems that fragment the financial architecture and, over time, erode US leverage and dollar centrality—even as the dollar remains dominant. I emphasize heterogeneous switching costs, with near-term change concentrated in the “plumbing” (messaging, clearing, legal venue) rather than in core reserve functions, and sketch two possible futures-bifurcated rival blocs versus pluralistic coexistence—calling on scholars and policymakers to rethink coercive statecraft in light of sanctions’ long-term institutional legacies.