Among the many intrigues described by Thucydides in Book viii one of the strangest and most obscure is the episode in which Phrynichos, while serving as one of the commanders of the Athenian fleet at Samos, twice sent messages to Astyochos, the Spartan ναύαρχος. Because the intrigue was conducted with the utmost secrecy, detailed information about it cannot have been easily obtainable, and the motives of all the persons involved, who included Alkibiades and Tissaphernes, were perhaps fully known to nobody. The account given by Thucydides (50–1) leaves much unexplained: it gives the impression that he has recorded what he has ascertained from a single informant without adding much comment or interpretation of his own. Had he lived to revise Book viii, he would scarcely have left these chapters as they stand. The object of this paper is to examine these chapters and to suggest that the intrigues of Phrynichos described in them were less exclusively personal in aim, and had somewhat more important consequences, than is generally believed.
The picture of Phrynichos drawn by Thucydides presents him from the outset as a man of exceptional shrewdness who held strong views and did not hesitate to press vigorously for their acceptance even where they were not shared by others. The arguments whereby he dissuaded his colleagues, immediately after their victorious land operations at Miletos, from risking a sea-battle against the newly reinforced Peloponnesian fleet are recorded in some detail (27. 1–4) and with explicit approval (27. 5). Shortly before the episode of his communications with Astyochos he opposed in outspoken terms the plan of the Athenian trierarchs and others who were negotiating with Alkibiades with the intention of overthrowing the democracy and obtaining Persian support. Thucydides devotes a long passage of oratio obliqua to the objections of Phrynichos (48. 4–7). He maintained that Alkibiades was indifferent to the proposed change of constitution and was interested only in securing his own recall; that to Persia the existing alliance with the Peloponnesians was more advantageous than an alliance with Athens could be; that the establishment of an oligarchy would not improve, and might well damage, Athenian relations with the allies. Thucydides expressly concurs with the first of these arguments (48. 4, ὅπερ καὶ ἦν), and his approval of the other two may perhaps be inferred from his subsequent narrative, which confirms their validity.