Much agreement exists among economic historians that an institutional structure which allows for broad participation in a country's economy is conducive to growth. With respect to England's institutional structure, changes that followed the Glorious Revolution of 1688 are given pride of place in recent literature. This article contributes to this literature by highlighting and explaining regulatory change that removed barriers to entry into the country's most vital industry, textiles, in the years between 1550 and 1640. However, although economic historians have tended to explain England's growth-facilitating institutions as arising abruptly through political revolution that placed constraints on the Crown, this article will elucidate change that was protracted, accretive, peaceful, and came through royal institutions. More specifically, this article argues that restrictive regulations, which were widely supported, were removed because Crown and Council, in consultation with local officials, recognized that enforcement would come at the cost of the greater priority of employment preservation.

The history of England's institutions has long informed research on comparative economic development. Yet to date, there exists no quantitative evidence on a core aspect of England's institutional evolution, that embodied in the accumulated decisions of English courts. Focusing on the two centuries before the Industrial Revolution, we generate and analyze the first quantitative estimates of the development of English caselaw and its associated legal ideas. We achieve this in two companion papers. In this, the first of the pair, we build a comprehensive corpus of 52,949 reports of cases heard in England's high courts before 1765. Estimating a 100-topic structural topic model, we name and interpret all topics, each of which reflects a distinctive aspect of English legal thought. We produce time series of the estimated topic prevalences. To interpret the topic timelines, we develop a tractable model of the evolution of legal-cultural ideas and their prominence in case reports. In the companion paper, we will illustrate with multiple applications the usefulness of the large amount of new information generated by our approach.

Frank H. Knight's magnum opus Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, published in 1921, is widely recognized for introducing and establishing the distinction between risk and uncertainty. It is also known for developing a novel theory of the firm and business profit based on entrepreneurial judgment. However, the work's relevance for institutionalism has only rarely been addressed or even acknowledged. This introduction to the special issue organized to celebrate the centenary of Knight's tome briefly summarizes the work's institutionalist implications and the articles that comprise the special issue.

We can all agree that institutions matter, though as to which institutions matter most, and how much any of them matter, the matter is, paraphrasing Douglass North's words at the Nobel podium, unresolved after seven decades of immense effort. We suggest that the obstacle to progress is the paradigm of the New Institutional Economics itself. In this paper, we propose a new theory that is: grounded in institutions as coevolving sources of economic growth rather than as rules constraining growth; and deployed in dynamical systems theory rather than game theory. We show that with our approach some long-standing problems are resolved, in particular, the paradoxical and perplexingly pervasive influence of informal constraints on the long-run character of economies.

Silvestri interviews McCloskey about her forthcoming book, ‘Beyond Behaviorism, Positivism, and Neo-Institutionalism in Economics’, critical of recent economics, especially of neo-institutionalism. Neo-institutionalism uses the ugly character ‘Herr Max U’ as its central idea: the elevation of Prudence to the only virtue. Institutions are mainly intermediate, not ultimate, causes in society. Ethics, rhetoric, identity, ideology, and ideas matter. McCloskey's turn to defending liberalism is in the background of her critique of behaviorism, positivism, and neo-institutionalism as anti-liberal, reducing the analysis of people to a model of childish slaves. Liberalism is the theory of non-slave adults. Of the big ideas of the past few centuries, only liberalism treats people with suitable dignity, and permits them to have a go, and make others rich. Neo-institutionalism shares the two sins of modern Samuelsonian economics: a devotion of mere existence proofs; and a deviation to arbitrary tests of statistical ‘significance’. And in its tale of a rise of ‘capitalism’, it shares the errors of amateur economic history. The better word for the modern economic world of the Great Enrichment – fully 3,000% increases in real income per person – is ‘innovism’. Neo-institutionalism, as the method of historical economics, must be replaced by ‘Humanomics’.

Policy lessons are often drawn from the emergence in Europe of ‘inclusive’ institutions, which are held to have displaced ‘extractive’ institutions and fostered economic growth. This article analyzes the concept of inclusiveness using evidence on a historical institution that has been widely viewed as inclusive – the guild. It finds that we must differentiate between three types of inclusiveness: community, corporative, and societal. Community inclusiveness refers to the share of individuals involved in an institution's operations, corporative inclusiveness the share of political representation enjoyed by the institution itself, and societal inclusiveness the extent to which the institution enables full economic and political participation by everyone in society. We must also distinguish between general inclusiveness, which takes into account general-equilibrium effects, and partial inclusiveness, which assumes away such effects. Inclusiveness and extractiveness are not opposites in theory, and guilds show why certain types of inclusive institution are likely to behave in extractive ways. Finally, guilds alert us to trade-offs between inclusive economic institutions, inclusive political institutions, and inclusive growth. History does not imply abandoning the concept of inclusiveness, but rather thinking about it carefully.

Smart contracts have been proposed as a means of revolutionizing transacting between human actors and contributing to blockchain platforms substituting for many current institutions. However, the technical nature of blockchain platforms and smart contracts requires levels of certainty and foresight sufficient for contracts to be complete. We examine the technical and economic characteristics of blockchains and smart contracts to identify sources of uncertainty that may pose challenges to the ability of these technologies to displace existing institutional arrangements, in particular, the courts and other arbitration arrangements. Despite the development of alternative automated blockchain institutions such as the Kleros dispute resolution system, the case for smart contracts and blockchain applications to supplant real-world institutions remains weak. Inherent incompleteness due to limits to information availability, human cognition, and communication means that traditional contract governance institutions will continue to complement blockchain smart contract governance arrangements. The more complex and unique the transaction, the higher the value at risk, the harder to anticipate and precisely specify contingencies and measure and observe outcomes. Furthermore, the longer the time frame between agreement and execution, the less likely it is that smart contracting will be more efficient than traditional contracting.

This paper explains how informal institutions influence the reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic and the response to formal restrictions. I claim that it is not enough to introduce countermeasures, as individuals must follow them if they are to be effective. The acceptance of such measures is reflected in individuals' degrees of mobility decrease and contact reduction, the aims of governmental restrictions. I identify a group of attitudes connected with individuals' responses that differ across countries. They are associated with social relations and approaches to dealing with problems. The analysis confirms that formal restrictions can be seen as successful only if they are supported by strong informal institutions. In some cases, they even define individuals' reactions more than formal recommendations. The findings are useful not only for explaining the special case of reaction to pandemic restrictions but also for investigating what generally determines individuals' compliance with formal rules.

The last two chapters of Frank H. Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit are seldom cited and frequently ignored. But in those chapters, Knight moves from entrepreneurial judgment and organizational strategies to meet the dilemmas uncertainty presents in a firm to the wider question of how uncertainty affects the social organization of economic activity. Ignoring the concluding chapters of Knight's book means we miss an important part of his early career thoughts on the tradeoffs between free enterprise and the social organization of economic activity. The purpose of the paper is to lay out the perspective on social economic organization that he took in the final two chapters of his first major work against the context of his other contemporary writings.

From a modern institutional economics viewpoint, blockchain is an institutional technology that minimizes transaction costs and greatly reduces intermediation. Through an analysis of blockchain, I demonstrate the possibilities of extended institutional approach – a new generation of complexity-focused methodologies and theories of institutional analysis that complement and expand the standard institutional paradigm. By using the theory of transaction value, I argue blockchain technologies not only will lead to a significant reduction in transaction costs but will also reorient intermediaries toward improving the quality of transactions and expanding the offer of additional transaction services. The theory of institutional assemblages indicates it is impossible to form a homogeneous system of blockchain-based institutions associated exclusively with the principles of decentralization, transparency, and openness. Blockchain-based institutions will be of a hybrid and conflicting nature, combining elements of opposing institutional logics – regulatory and algorithmic law, Ricardian and smart contracts, private and public systems, and uncontrollability and arbitration.

This is the second of two papers that generate and analyze quantitative estimates of the development of English caselaw and associated legal ideas before the Industrial Revolution. In the first paper, we estimated a 100-topic structural topic model, named the topics, and showed how to interpret topic-prevalence timelines. Here, we provide examples of new insights that can be gained from these estimates. We first provide a bird's-eye view, aggregating the topics into 15 themes. Procedure is the highest-prevalence theme, but by the mid-18th century attention to procedure decreases sharply, indicating solidification of court institutions. Important ideas on real-property were substantially settled by the mid-17th century and on contracts and torts by the mid-18th century. Thus, crucial elements of caselaw developed before the Industrial Revolution. We then examine the legal ideas associated with England's financial revolution. Many new legal ideas relevant to finance were well accepted before the Glorious Revolution. Finally, we examine the sources of law used in the courts. Emphasis on precedent-based reasoning increases by 1650, but diffusion was gradual, with pertinent ideas solidifying only after 1700. Ideas on statute applicability were accepted by the mid-16th century but debates on legislative intent were still occurring in 1750.

Social contract theory depicts a constitutional contract as the result of a hypothetical agreement among society's members to escape a prisoners' dilemma situation. It depicts citizens as political equals agreeing to be forced into a cooperative strategy rather than a socially suboptimal strategy that gives them the highest personal payoff. Government is the organization that forces everyone to cooperate. However, citizens can never bargain as political equals. An elite few design the rules, and others are forced to comply with them. The contractarian ideology that depicts government as acting in the general public interest legitimizes the actions of government, giving those elite few who hold government power a greater ability to use it to further their own interests, often at the expense of the masses. Within the context of a prisoners' dilemma game, contractarian ideology leads to an outcome that is socially suboptimal, but beneficial for the political elite.

This paper links banking system development to the colonial and legal history of African countries. Based on a sample of 40 African countries from 2000 to 2018, our empirical findings show a significant dependence of current financial institutions on the inherited legal origin and the colonization type. Findings also reveal that current financial legal institutions are not major determinants of banking system development, and that institutional development and governance quality are more important. A high share of government spending relative to GDP also positively affects banking system development in African countries.

This paper identifies political property rights and jurisdictional rivalry as two important mechanisms that drive political and economic development. After developing a general framework to explain relative performance in the ‘market for governance’, we argue that Western Europe during the High Middle Ages presented initial conditions conducive to the development of effective states. We extend the framework by analyzing city-state governance in Renaissance Italy, as well as public finance practices in early modern Germany. We conclude by discussing the implications of our argument for the literature on state capacity and economic development. The takeaway is that well-aligned political property rights and competition in the provision of governance services can promote the protective and productive state while forestalling the predatory state.

This paper investigates what drives countries to legislate presumed consent – making citizens organ donors by default unless they opt out – instead of explicit consent. Results reveal the following: First, civil law predicts presumed consent, which uncovers a mechanism by which an institution that long pre-dates transplantation medicine has an impact on current health outcomes. This is in line with previous research that has found that civil law regimes tend to be more comfortable with a centralized and activist government than common law ones. Second, Catholicism predicts presumed consent. This is consistent with previous research that shows Catholicism generally relies on more hierarchical structures and is less likely to encourage social responsibility among its members. Last, higher pro-social behavior decreases the likelihood of presumed consent. This could be explained by policy-makers trying not to discourage donations where pro-social behavior is high by making it look a requirement rather than an altruistic act. The implications of the findings are discussed, with a particular focus on policy-switches in organ donations.

This paper proposes a new conceptualization of business model (BM) that rigorously exploits the important insights this notion offers and links them to related views developed in economics and business studies. We develop the foundations of a BM concept consistent with the principles of generalized Darwinism (GD) and with contributions already developed within this framework. Thus, we demonstrate the relevance of GD as a unifying framework for developing the evolutionary theory of firm and industry. We suggest analysing BM as a generative replicator hosted by the firm, which structures interactions between the members of this organization and the social entities of its industrial environment. We argue that GD allows us to clarify the nature and boundaries of the BM concept and to specify its relationships to other key evolutionary concepts, such as organizational routines.

For some 25 years in revolutionary Haiti, most of the productive land was nationalized and run as state property. This paper shows that this economic system can be accurately described as agrarian socialism. Its life and death are compared with the experiences of 20th-century socialist regimes and their transition to a market economy, paying special attention to the kindred case of São Tomé. Haitian socialism is interesting because it was the unintended, accidental product of an emergency situation: the killing or flight of all the French landlords, which made their land vacant property and drove the state to run it in the public interest to defend the revolution. Therefore, it can be read as a natural experiment in socialism in the absence of a socialist ideology and of a socialist party that could hold the system together, constrain its income distribution, and control its eventual privatization.

The implications of Knightian uncertainty are frequently discussed in the context of market-based institutional settings. Given money prices, entrepreneurs can engage in calculative action, in conjunction with ‘judgment’, to guide decision-making and bring about a coordination of production plans with consumer preferences. However, if the existence of Knightian uncertainty is ubiquitous and applies to all human action, then what are its implications in non-market institutional settings? This paper explores questions related to the implications of Knightian uncertainty for two important non-market institutional settings: democratic government and the nonprofit or philanthropic sector, where there is an explicit lack of monetary calculation, yet nonprofit and political entrepreneurs still must use ‘judgment’ to deal with Knightian uncertainty. For instance, what are the implications of private property and privatized cost in the case of nonprofits versus the absence of private property and socialized cost in the case of democracy, in the presence of Knightian uncertainty? Which group of ‘consumers’ is likely to have their preferences satisfied when it comes to nonprofits (benefactors or beneficiaries) and democratic government (voters or lobbyists)? The paper, thus, points to the importance of further research on the implications of Knightian uncertainty in the hard case of non-market institutional settings.

Social norms pervade society and when they conflict with legal norms, the former undermine the latter making them ineffective. In this study, we propose that the extortion racket in Sicily has turned into a social norm and this is why recent top-down interventions have failed in stalling this socially undesirable activity. One exception is represented by Addiopizzo, a grass root movement that uses non-legal means to fight the racket phenomenon in Sicily. During the last 15 years, Addiopizzo was able to produce an effective reduction in the payment of protection money in the Sicilian city of Palermo by triggering, we suggest, among other things, a process of change in social norms. Acknowledging the importance of a change in social norms to achieve social change allows us to link the theory of institutions as ‘rules’ with the theory of institutions as ‘equilibria’.

We examine the development of de jure property rights to land by assessing how accurately governments recorded borders of property. We use surveys of farm parcels from two historical states, the Republic of the Orange Free State (OFS) and the South African Republic (ZAR), which are in modern-day South Africa, and employ a descriptive analysis to infer how accurately maps represent parcels of property. We argue that differences in state administrative capacity explains differences in map accuracy and therefore the provision of de jure property rights to land. We find that maps of farms in the ZAR, which had lower administrative capacity, tend to be less accurate than maps of farms in the OFS. Comparisons with military maps compiled under a different administration provide evidence that the costs incurred from previous administrations can limit future attempts to accurately record property. The analysis shows how state administrative capacity can facilitate (or hinder) the provision of property rights to land.