This paper discusses how point of view (POV) is expressed in British Sign Language (BSL) and spoken English narrative discourse. Spoken languages can mark changes in POV using strategies such as direct/indirect discourse, whereas signed languages can mark changes in POV in a unique way using “role shift”. Role shift is where the signer “becomes” a referent by taking on attributes of that referent, e.g. facial expression. In this study, two native BSL users and two native British English speakers were asked to tell the story “The Tortoise and the Hare”. The data were then compared to see how point of view is expressed and maintained in both languages. The results indicated that the spoken English users preferred the narrator's perspective, whereas the BSL users preferred a character's perspective. This suggests that spoken and signed language users may structure stories in different ways. However, some co-speech gestures and facial expressions used in the spoken English stories to denote characters' thoughts and feelings bear resemblance to the hand movements and facial expressions used by the BSL storytellers. This suggests that while approaches to storytelling may differ, both languages share some gestural resources which manifest themselves in different ways across different modalities.

Past evidence suggests that adult Mandarin speakers rely on shape more heavily than English speakers when categorizing solid objects (Kuo and Sera 2009). In this experiment, we began to examine that effect developmentally by investigating the acquisition of the three most common Mandarin Chinese classifiers for solid objects (i.e. ge, zhi and tiao) in relation to development in shape-based categorization by native speakers of Mandarin and English from 3 years of age to adulthood. We found that 3-year-old Mandarin speakers were above chance in their classifier knowledge, but this knowledge continued to develop through 7 years of age. We also found that Mandarin speakers relied more heavily on shape than English speakers, and that shape-based categorization among English speakers tended to decline with age on the trials in which shape choices matched the Mandarin classifiers. The findings suggest that classifiers initially augment Mandarin speakers' attention to the shape of solid objects, and then maintain this early stronger shape bias after they are fully learned. The work highlights how categorization and word learning are graded and intertwined.

As part of the continuing growth and diver sification of Language and Cognition, this special double issue focuses on the evolution of language. Although this controver sial topic has been discussed for centuries from different per spectives, it is probably safe to say that genuine progress has only begun to take place during the past 25 years or so, as increasing numbers of researcher s have star ted pooling a broad array of relevant ideas and discoveries from a tremendous range of disciplines, including, in alphabetical order, anthropology, archeology, ar tificial life, biology, cognitive science, genetics, linguistics, modeling, neuroscience, paleontology, primatology, and psychology. The rapid expansion and maturation of this field of inquiry is evident in sever al ways. Since 1990, more and more articles about the evolution of language have appeared in prominent, high-ranking journals such as Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, and Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience. In addition, the publication of books on this topic has been on the rise, and there is now a whole series of impressive monogr aphs under the rubric “Oxford Studies in the Evolution of Language.” Fur thermore, beginning in 1996, the International Conference on the Evolution of Language has been held every other year to provide a public forum for the presentation and evaluation of new developments (http://www.evolang.org/).

The short answer to the question of How the Brain Got Language is “through biological and cultural evolution.” The challenge is to be more specific. I use the term “the language-ready brain” to suggest that the brain of early Homo sapiens was adequate to support language but that it required tens of millennia for humans to be able to exploit these innate neural capabilities to develop, cumulatively, languages and the societies that made languages possible and necessary. The ability to surf the World Wide Web is a recent example of society's expanding ability to develop technologies and social structures which allow humans to exploit their neural capabilities in ways that were not part of the adaptive pressures for biological evolution.

The two-fold challenge of the book, then, is to understand (i) what are the mechanisms of the language-ready brain and what adaptive pressures evolved them biologically; and (ii) how did those mechanisms support the emergence of language as well as modern-day patterns of language change, acquisition and use, and the social interactions which support them?

We report on two experiments that ask when and under what linguistic conditions comprehenders construct detailed shape representations of mentioned objects, and whether these can change over the course of a sentence when new information contradicts earlier expectations. We used Japanese because the verb-final word order of Japanese presented a revealing test case where information about objects can radically change with a subsequent verb. The results show that language understanders consistently generate a distinct and detailed shape for an object by integrating the semantic contributions of different sentential elements. These results first confirm that the tendency to generate specific shape information about objects that are involved in described events is not limited to English, but is also present in Japanese, a typologically and genetically distinct language. But more importantly, they shed light on the processing mechanism of object representation, showing that mental representations are initiated sentence medially, and are rapidly revised if followed by a verb that implies a change to an object shape. This work contributes to ongoing research on incremental language processing – comprehenders appear to construct extremely detailed semantic representations early in a sentence, and modify them as needed.

As speakers, we are frequently called upon to specify the locations of objects and landmarks in our environment. However, despite the considerable body of work on spatial cognition and semantics (i.e. Levinson 1992, 1996, 2003; Tyler and Evans 2003; Herskovits 1986; Vandeloise 1986), there has been almost no research on the expression of location from a multimodal viewpoint: that is, how do speakers use gesture, as well as speech, to express object location? This paper reports on a filmed study of 10 English speakers and 10 French speakers who were asked to express the locations of 28 objects in two spatial scenes. On the basis of our results we argue that a functional, as opposed to a grammatical, approach to the segmentation and analysis of these sorts of expressions is crucial. Such an approach reflects the fact that different Figures (i.e. objects to be located) can exist simultaneously across speech and gesture. Using filmed examples from our data set, we propose a new definition of static locative expressions and outline a multimodal approach for their analysis in oral discourse.

Arbib offers a coherent proposal of how the brain has evolved to become language-capable. Integral to the argument are mirror neurons, cells discovered in macaque brains with interesting firing patterns, and studies on gestural communication of great apes. Here, I first discuss some complexities of the recent mirror neuron literature, which suggest that ‘mirroring’ may be an ontogenetically acquired, not an evolved, feature of neurons. Second, it is now clear that chimpanzee vocal behaviour is strongly mediated by social variables, and that individuals can use vocalisations to persuade and inform others, facts that have implications for gestural theories of language evolution. I conclude with discussing research most needed for making progress in understanding how human language has evolved.

Among the typologically agglutinative Finno-Ugric languages, Estonian is in many ways exceptional since it has developed a long way towards the analytic type. One indicator of this is the extensive use of particles and adverbs to indicate grammatical relations such as aspect. Our paper discusses, in a Cognitive Grammar framework, the grammatical functions of the adverb välja ‘out’, which is originally an illative (‘into’) case form of the lexical noun väli ‘field’. Our study shows how the meanings evolve along a continuum from concrete senses to more abstract ones, and we set out to find motivations for the development. The form välja has developed numerous usages as an adverb and a verb particle. Its concrete spatial meaning is that of indicating a relation where a mover exits a (typically three-dimensional) container and moves from its inside to its outside. The abstract functions of this multi-functional gram include the following ones: 1) a change in the cognitive state of an animate participant (e.g., as the result of acquiring information), 2) changes-of-state metaphorically represented as motion out of a container, 3) terminative direction or distance (‘all the way to X’) and 4) perfective aspect. We argue that a crucial factor in the development of these functions is the placement of the conceptualizer's viewpoint either inside or outside the container which the mover exits. A viewpoint outside the container means that in the initial configuration the mover is hidden from the conceptualizer's view, and when exiting the container it becomes accessible to the conceptualizer. This meaning motivates abstract functions where välja indicates incipient availability or accessibility of the mover. On the other hand, a viewpoint situated inside the container results in the meaning where the mover (that exits the container) escapes from the conceptualizer's view, or, in abstract expressions, its cognitive dominion. This motivates the use of the gram in many expressions of a change of state, and in particular builds a link to its aspectual functions where it indicates the spatiotemporal extent of an event or an entity by measuring the distance from the starting point of such (concrete or metaphorical) motion.

This paper examines the relationship between the concepts of ‘seeing’ and ‘attempting/trying’ in various languages. These concepts have so far been found to be co-lexified in languages spoken in Eurasia, Papua New Guinea, India and West Africa, with an added implicature of politeness present in some languages when this lexical item is used in directives. After establishing a cross-linguistic sample, the paper proposes a specific grammaticalization mechanism as responsible for producing this semantic relationship. The explanation centers on a process involving metaphorical transfer, the loss of semantic features, generalization, and a specific syntactic context conducive to this meaning shift. First, the Mind-as-Body metaphor is applied to the mind-related notion of ‘seeing an object’ to derive the body-related notion of ‘controlling an object’, as has previously been demonstrated to be the case in the history of certain Indo-European languages. Second, semantic bleaching causes the meaning component of physical sight to be lost from the overall meaning of the morpheme, and semantic generalization allows attempted actions to be mentally treated the same as physical objects that are manipulated. Finally, the context in which this meaning shift occurs is posited as constructions involving multiverbs, such as serial verbs or converbs.

Objects can almost always be called by more than one name, and the name chosen depends on the context. However, studies of naming in some traditions elicit names by showing objects in isolation and asking merely What is it? If the names produced are not the same as those that would be given in more fully specified communicative contexts, the value of the tasks for understanding object naming is in doubt. The current study examined the effects of different communicative demands on naming of 60 household containers. A standard “free naming” task was contrasted with two other versions. In these two, participants had the goal of getting an addressee to find a target object among others. In one, each object needed to be distinguished from a small set of dissimilar objects, visible to the addressee. In the other, each needed to be distinguished from a large set of similar objects, not visible to the addressee. Responses were sensitive to context in the number of modifiers produced. However, they were insensitive in the head nouns produced. Simple naming tasks such as What is it? can produce results for head nouns equivalent to those from tasks providing more fully specified communicative contexts.

In this book it has been proposed that the mirror system can be a scaffold for building a language-ready brain, because of its property of matching action observation with action execution, a feature that can correspond to the “parity” requirement for communication. In this commentary we will first emphasize two properties of mirror neurons and motor cortex that may have contributed to language: the generalization of the property of understanding action goals and the capacity to decode the goal of action sequences. Then we will propose, based on recent behavioural and neurophysiological data in monkeys, that the vocalization in non-human primates could have reached a partial voluntary control, thus contributing to the emergence of a communicative system relying on the coordination of gestures and utterances.

Comprehension of unfamiliar metaphors (mercy blanket) is an effortful cognitive process that requires the formation of a novel metaphoric mapping between two disparate domains during which irrelevant properties have to be suppressed. The present study aims to examine the relationship between the comprehension of both unfamiliar and familiar metaphors and working memory. Three experiments were conducted: a comprehension task (Experiment 1), a recognition task (Experiments 2a and 2b), and a free recall task (Experiment 3). In the first experiment comprehension of both unfamiliar and familiar metaphors correlated with digit span backward but not with digit span forward. Results of the second experiment revealed that unfamiliar metaphors induced a higher rate of semantic errors relative to phonological errors, whereas familiar metaphors induced the same number of phonological and semantic errors. The third experiment confirmed that unfamiliar metaphors were harder to recall than were familiar metaphors. These findings show that working memory capacity may be involved in the computation of unfamiliar metaphoric interpretations, and more specifically in the process of suppressing irrelevant information via the central executive. Familiar metaphor recognition may rely on either phonological codes that are maintained in the phonological loop or on semantic processing that involves long term storage.

The role of numeric language in basic numerical cognition is explored via the consideration of results obtained in two recent independent studies, one with Nicaraguan homesigners and one with speakers of Pirahã. Attention is drawn to remarkable parallels between the relevant findings, parallels that provide compelling evidence that adults without access to numeric language face difficulties when simply attempting to differentiate quantities greater than three.

The Mirror System Hypothesis of Michael Arbib (2012), with respect to the cultural evolutionary origins of syntactic structure, allows to make a set of predictions about the neural mechanisms that govern the processing of modern human languages. Neuroimaging techniques may be employed to test these predictions and inform an evolutionary theory of language syntax. In this commentary, I will argue that future neuroimaging research needs in particular to: i) clarify whether linear sequential versus non-linear hierarchical structure differentially depend on mirror neurons as opposed to higher-order heteromodal cortices; ii) challenge current neuroscientific evidence on multilingualism: as it stands, syntactic processing appears to be mediated by the same neural mechanisms across languages, independently of cross-linguistic idiosyncrasies; iii) devise longitudinal studies of grammar acquisition in newborns and children; iv) recreate in the laboratory nearly-ecological conditions for the emergence of syntactic constructions through cultural and social interaction, and exploit the “experiment of nature” of pidgin and creole languages.

In this commentary, I argue (i) that there are some peripheral homologies between the monkey and the human vocalization systems; (ii) that complex vocal learning can be achieved without need of a voluntary hand grasping circuit; and (iii) that in the monkey there are rudimentary circuits that can convey auditory information into Broca's region, via the “ventral pathway” but also via the arcuate or the superior longitudinal fasciculi.

Arbib's How the brain got language is a major achievement in defining a trajectory for the evolution of complex imitation and the language-ready brain leading to human language. In addition to these capabilities, I will suggest that it is useful to consider two additional components of human brain function that are intricately related to the emergence of language. These are, first, the profound human motivation to represent and share the psychological states of others, and second, the related complex semantic system that represents the contents of what is communicated in language. In this sense, these two components represent part of what is under the iceberg, where language is the emerging tip.