Together, Asian American and Latino evangelicals constitute about 13% of all evangelicals in the United States. This proportion is surely going to increase as new immigrants enter the United States from Asia and Latin America and the number of White evangelicals remains steady or even falls. But the extent and nature of the effects of evangelical identity on the political attitudes of growing numbers of Latinos and Asian Americans have not been studied systematically. This article aims to fill that gap by comparing the effects of evangelical identity on political attitudes across a range of groups to better address the conditional effects of religious identity on political orientations in an increasingly diverse context. The primary research question driving the study is does born-again identity play a consistent role across racial groups in determining political attitudes?

This article assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the religious economy approach by applying it to the religious revival across contemporary Russia and China. This comparison shows that the religious economy framework is beneficial in explaining some aspects of the communist and post-communist religious change, including macroeconomic market trends and why some faiths thrive while others fail. However, it has less explanatory power in explaining religious-state relations under market constraints — that is, how religious groups interact with state regulators to survive and grow; the range of options available to religious actors and their payoffs; and the political consequence of this interaction. This article draws on fieldwork in both countries to illustrate the benefits of grounding the religious economy approach more deeply in politics. The political economy of the marketplace reveals how and why religious groups engage the state to survive, and that they are becoming influential political and economic actors.

We test for relationships between anti-Muslim attitudes and opinion and competing religious identity and religious belief variables in an evangelical Christian constituency. Original survey data from a statewide sample of 508 likely voters in Oklahoma are subjected to a robust regression analysis to determine (1) indicators of holding Christian nationalist beliefs and (2) the relationship between belief measures of Christian nationalism, evangelical Christian identity, and subsequent anti-Muslim sentiment. Christian nationalism is more prevalent among self-identified evangelicals. Christian nationalist beliefs and strong belief in Biblical literalism are significantly related to negative and restrictive views of Muslims. Anti-Muslim sentiments in the form of general disapproval and the desire to limit Muslim worship are shaped more by beliefs than identities or behaviors. Evangelical self-identification does not help us disentangle domestic opinion regarding Muslims as well as measures that disentangle beliefs from identity.

In the last two decades, several Muslim states and civil society groups have embraced interfaith dialogue as a means of engagement with non-Muslims, especially with Christians. Why do these actors initiate interfaith dialogue? Why do they follow different interfaith dialogue strategies? This article argues that Islamic actors initiate interfaith dialogue to signal their moderate stance to powerful others who are concerned with Islamic radicalization and violence. These Islamic interfaith actors follow different strategies because of their interfaith theology (ideas about the legitimacy of religious others) and the nature of state-religion interaction (secular versus religious states) in their home countries. To support its argument, this article examines three Muslim interfaith initiatives: the Gülen Movement in Turkey and beyond (Sunni-Sufi, a civil society-led project), Jordan's A Common Word initiative (Sunni, a semi-governmental project), and Saudi Arabia's interfaith efforts (Sunni-Wahhabi, a state-led project).

Past research shows that religious beliefs can shape political activity. Yet current literature leaves open many questions about the mechanisms at work. I point to the key role of a particular religious belief found across denominations: providentiality, or the belief that God has a plan that humans can further. When these beliefs are connected to politics, providential believers are likely to be active and dedicated participators. I test this notion using survey data collected during the 2012 election campaign from congregants in Little Rock, Arkansas. In general, providential believers are less likely than their non-providential counterparts to participate in politics. However, when providential believers report hearing political sermons from their clergy, they are significantly more likely to participate. These findings illustrate one pathway by which religious beliefs can influence politics: through a cue that links providentiality and politics.

Research shows that areas with high levels of aggregate religiosity are less likely to elect female candidates to national, state, and local offices. These studies, however, do not determine the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. In the present analysis, we seek to examine what role, if any, religious exposure and tradition play in determining individuals’ general election vote choices in mixed-gender contests. To explore this relationship, we use data from the 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies. We find some evidence of a relationship between religious beliefs and voting for female congressional candidates; when compared to secular voters, evangelical Protestants and Catholics are more likely to vote for Republican women and less likely to support Democratic women. Our results, however, also underscore partisan identities’ central role in shaping individual vote choice, regardless of a candidate's gender.

The political liberalism of American Jews is puzzling because it contradicts the assumption that economic self-interest drives political behavior. Attempts to solve this puzzle with “Judaic” explanations compound the problem by offering theories that are static and universal while American Jewish political behavior is dynamic and situational. Using both historical and behavioral data, I argue that the solution to these puzzles is found in the overriding concern of American Jews with maintaining their equal citizenship in a society with a classic liberal regime of religion and state. This situational model also helps integrate work on Jewish political studies with theories and concepts commonly used by political scientists to explain mass political behavior.

Immigrants to the United States often fail to develop partisan identities, which can be a political impediment. While the development of partisanship has received substantial attention in the existing literature, further research is needed to understand the origins of partisanship for new immigrants who lack the socialized psychological attachments that drive partisanship for many Americans. I theorize that preceding changes in salient social identities may facilitate the formation of partisan attachments as an adaptive response to a new environment. Specifically, I contend that religious conversion, an adaptive change in one's religious identity, increases the probability of political adaptation among Latino immigrants, the largest immigrant group in the United States. Using data from a 2006 Pew survey of Latino religious life, I show that conversion among Latino immigrants is associated with a greater partisan identification, which suggests religious conversion may function as an intervening adaptation in the evolution of partisanship.

How do states decide to extend or withhold international recognition in cases of contested sovereignty? We focus on how religion shapes the incentives of states in making this decision, both at the domestic level through religious institutions and at the international level through religious affinities. States with transnational religious ties to the contested territory are more likely to extend recognition. At the domestic level, states that heavily regulate religion are less likely to extend international recognition. We test these conjectures, and examine others in the literature, with two new data sets on the international recognition of both Palestine and Israel and voting on the United Nations resolution to admit Palestine as a non-member state observer, combined with global data on religious regulation and religious affinities. In cases of contested sovereignty, the results provide support for these two mechanisms through which religion shapes foreign policy decisions about international recognition.

The conventional wisdom on evangelical American Protestant support for the use of torture on suspected terrorists is incorrect. With data from the 2008 American National Election Studies survey, we specify the interactive influence of religious traditions on attitudes toward torture by religious commitment and belief orthodoxy. Only at low orthodoxy, and low to average commitment, are Catholics, mainline, and black Protestants more likely to support torture than the unaffiliated; the effect for evangelical Protestants is null. Greater commitment moves most traditions and the unaffiliated toward increased opposition to torture. Stronger orthodoxy, however, leads to support for torture only for the unaffiliated. The findings persist given controls for demographic characteristics, party identification, left-right self-placement, and authoritarian values.

American Jews voted overwhelmingly for Barack Obama in 2012 despite strong Republican efforts to win their votes. Republicans charged that Obama was not sufficiently supportive of Israel and that Mitt Romney was closer to Jewish opinions on this salient issue. Republicans miscalculated. For most American Jews, Israel was not a key voting issue. American Jews were also closer to Obama on Middle East issues than they were to Republicans. There was also a cultural chasm between American Jews and the Tea Party, reflective of long-standing tensions between Jews and evangelicals. Using surveys of the Jewish vote and the full electorate, I show that this cultural divide was more salient for Jews than for other white voters — and that there is at least preliminary evidence that this cultural divide may be important for other minority groups.

Prior to the 2012 presidential election, some commentators speculated that Mitt Romney's status as a devout and active member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints would undermine his presidential aspirations. Using the 2012 American National Election Survey, this study examines the relationship between attitudes toward Mormons and voter behavior in the United States in that election year. It finds that attitudes toward Mormons had a statistically-significant effect on turnout — though these effects differed according to party identification. It additionally finds that these attitudes influenced vote choice. In both cases, the substantive effects were small, indicating that anti-Mormon feelings did play a role in the 2012 presidential election, but they did not determine the final outcome.

While debates continue about the relationship between state-provided social welfare and religious charities, and whether organized religions are more capable of providing social welfare than is the public sector, less attention has focused on the question of what motivates religious adherents to contribute to the charitable work of their religions. In this article, we examine how adherents of Catholicism and Islam understand their generosity and its relationship to their faith. Through 218 semi-structured interviews with Catholics and Muslims in four cities in France, Ireland, Italy, and Turkey, we find systematic differences between the two religions. Catholics emphasize love of others and Muslims emphasize duty to God. We also find, contrary to expectations of the literature that emphasizes monitoring and sanctioning within groups to obtain cooperation, that Catholics and Muslims see their generosity as also motivated by the positive affect they feel towards their respective communities.

This article studies the influence of religion on political attitudes in Israel by testing two propositions: “religion-friendly” democratization and “greedy” socialization. The former implies that accommodation of religious demands stimulates democratization, the latter argues that domineering religious socialization does not motivate democratic attitudes. Analysis of data from representative surveys conducted in 2006–2013, supports “greedy” socialization over the “religion friendly” hypothesis. I show that in most instances, socialization in religion-friendly environments does not moderate the political attitudes of religiously conservative groups. The results suggest that unbounded accommodation of religious needs in non-religious institutions may strengthen undemocratic political attitudes.

Religious dynamics in Europe, especially regarding religious pluralism, are largely affected by the characteristics of legal recognition of religious entities in individual countries. The implementation of the European Convention of Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights clearly points to democratic pluralism as the essential principle in treating religious entities by the state. On the other hand, the situation in European countries is very complex and certain tendencies opposite to the European Convention of Human Rights directions, particularly in terms of privileging of traditional entities, are still deeply entrenched. Recent changes in Slovenia, where two essentially parody religions have been registered, and in Hungary, where registration and recognition of previously registered churches have been annulled, are considered. It is argued that the implementation of the liberal course set by the Council of Europe is (still) largely dependent on the political situation in individual countries.

This article analyzes the role of religious actors at different stages in the long and gradual processes of democratization in Senegal. It examines the transformations in their political influence from pillars of the stable (but non-democratic) post-independence state, to a more ambiguous posture in the decade of democratic opening. A discussion of the interactive relationship between religious change and the transition to democracy over the course of the 1990s leads us to an analysis of the role of religious actors in debating the substantive content of Senegalese democracy in the decade that followed. The article concludes that while procedurally religious actors are playing an important role in the development of the democratic system in Senegal, substantively they are doing so in part by calling into question some understandings of what democracy entails. The ultimate evaluation of their contribution to the consolidation of democracy hinges at least in part on our conceptualization of democracy itself.

This article examines relationships between religion and racial intolerance across 47 countries by applying multilevel modeling to European survey data and is the first in-depth analysis of moderation of these relationships by European national contexts. The analysis distinguishes a believing, belonging, and practice dimension of religiosity. The results yield little evidence of a link between denominational belonging, religious practice, and racial intolerance. The religiosity dimension that matters most for racial intolerance in Europe is believing: believers in a traditional God and believers in a Spirit/Life Force are decidedly less likely, and fundamentalists are more likely than non-believers to be racially intolerant. National contexts also matter greatly: individuals living in Europe's most religious countries, countries with legacies of ethnic-religious conflict and countries with low GDP are significantly more likely to be racially intolerant than those living in wealthier, secular and politically stable countries. This is especially the case for the religiously devout.

This article examines the roles played by rural religious groups in China's local contentious politics. More specifically, it aims to explore whether religious groups stimulate or reduce collective contention when the ruler is both authoritarian and atheist. Drawing on national survey data and comparative case studies, this article finds that collective contention is less likely to occur in villages with religious groups that simultaneously overlap with secular social organizations and local authorities, and are hence more likely to serve as credible communication channels between local states and discontented citizens. This finding highlights two important issues that are often side-lined, if not outright neglected, in the existing literature. First, the relationship between religious groups and collective contention is diverse rather than uniform. Second, this relationship is shaped not only by religious groups but also by other important players in the local political arena.

This article argues that a new form of religious freedom is emerging within the contentious field of United States politics today. Despite the commitment to separating church and state that is characteristic of American secularism, implementation of the new religious freedom appears likely to contribute to processes that are actively reshaping religious and political landscapes. Recent US Supreme Court cases such as Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc. present clear examples and this article uses the former case to bring the dynamics of the new religious freedom to light. The push for religious freedom in contemporary United States law and politics should be assessed in terms of its transformative consequences in both “religious” and “political” spheres. These consequences include refashioning religious communities as increasingly hierarchical and isolated enclaves, undermining the rights and freedoms of citizens, and further fracturing the public sphere.