Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-45ctf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-21T15:44:20.376Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The second-order problem of other minds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2023

Ori Friedman Open the ORCID record for Ori Friedman [Opens in a new window]  and
Arber Tasimi Open the ORCID record for Arber Tasimi [Opens in a new window]
Ori Friedman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo N2L 3G1, Canada friedman@uwaterloo.ca https://uwaterloo.ca/psychology/people-profiles/ori-friedman
Arber Tasimi
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA arber.tasimi@emory.edu http://psychology.emory.edu/home/people/faculty/tasimi-arber.html
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The target article proposes that people perceive social robots as depictions rather than as genuine social agents. We suggest that people might instead view social robots as social agents, albeit agents with more restricted capacities and moral rights than humans. We discuss why social robots, unlike other kinds of depictions, present a special challenge for testing the depiction hypothesis.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e31
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Bowman-Smith, C. K., Goulding, B. W., & Friedman, O. (2018). Children hold owners responsible when property causes harm. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(8), 1191–1199. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000429CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Carlisle-Frank, P., Frank, J. M., & Nielsen, L. (2004). Selective battering of the family pet. Anthrozoös, 17(1), 26–42. https://doi.org/10.2752/089279304786991864CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crimston, C. R., Hornsey, M. J., Bain, P. G., & Bastian, B. (2018). Toward a psychology of moral expansiveness. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 27(1), 14–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417730888CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodwin, G. P. (2015). Experimental approaches to moral standing. Philosophy Compass, 10(12), 914–926. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12266CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. Science (New York, N.Y.), 315(5812), 619–619. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1134475CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Harnad, S. (1991). Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Minds and Machines, 1(1), 43–54. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00360578CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harris, J., & Anthis, J. R. (2021). The moral consideration of artificial entities: A literature review. Science and Engineering Ethics, 27(4), 1–95. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-021-00331-8CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Leslie, A. M., & Happé, F. (1989). Autism and ostensive communication: The relevance of metarepresentation. Development and Psychopathology, 1(3), 205–212. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579400000407CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levy, D. (2009). The ethical treatment of artificially conscious robots. International Journal of Social Robotics, 1(3), 209–216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12369-009-0022-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lillard, A. S. (1993). Pretend play skills and the child's theory of mind. Child Development, 64(2), 348–371. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1993.tb02914.xCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mitchell, R. W. (2004). Controlling the dog, pretending to have a conversation, or just being friendly? Influences of sex and familiarity on Americans’ talk to dogs during play. Interaction Studies, 5(1), 99–129. https://doi.org/10.1075/is.5.1.06mitCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nadler, J., & McDonnell, M. H. (2011). Moral character, motive, and the psychology of blame. Cornell Law Review, 97, 255–304.Google Scholar
Oppenheim, L. (1940). Law of slaves – A comparative study of the Roman and Louisiana systems. Tulane Law Review, 14, 384–406.Google Scholar
Rueben, M., Rothberg, E., & Matarić, M. J. (2020). Applying the theory of make-believe to human–robot interaction. In Nørskov, M., Seibt, J. & Quick, O. S. (Eds.), Culturally sustainable social robotics (pp. 40–50). IOS Press. https://doi.org/10.3233/FAIA200899Google Scholar
Weisman, K., Dweck, C. S., & Markman, E. M. (2017). Rethinking people's conceptions of mental life. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(43), 11374–11379. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.170434711CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed