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Social robots and the intentional stance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2023

Walter Veit Open the ORCID record for Walter Veit [Opens in a new window]  and
Heather Browning Open the ORCID record for Heather Browning [Opens in a new window]
Walter Veit
Affiliation:
School of History and Philosophy of Science, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia wrwveit@gmail.com; https://walterveit.com/
Heather Browning
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK DrHeatherBrowning@gmail.com; https://www.heatherbrowning.net/
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Abstract

Why is it that people simultaneously treat social robots as mere designed artefacts, yet show willingness to interact with them as if they were real agents? Here, we argue that Dennett's distinction between the intentional stance and the design stance can help us to resolve this puzzle, allowing us to further our understanding of social robots as interactive depictions.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e47
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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