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Individual difference in acts of self-sacrifice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Michael N. Stagnaro ,
Rebecca Littman  and
David G. Rand
Michael N. Stagnaro
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511. michael.stagnaro@yale.edurebecca.littman@yale.edudrand@mit.eduhttp://www.rebeccalittman.com/https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Ix83B_YAAAAJhttp://www.daverand.org/
Rebecca Littman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511. michael.stagnaro@yale.edurebecca.littman@yale.edudrand@mit.eduhttp://www.rebeccalittman.com/https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Ix83B_YAAAAJhttp://www.daverand.org/
David G. Rand
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511. michael.stagnaro@yale.edurebecca.littman@yale.edudrand@mit.eduhttp://www.rebeccalittman.com/https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Ix83B_YAAAAJhttp://www.daverand.org/
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Abstract

Whitehouse's model explains when people engage in self-sacrifice, but not who is most likely to do so. We propose incorporating individual differences, such as cognitive style (one's inclination toward intuition versus deliberation), and argue that individuals who rely on intuition may be more likely to (1) develop group identity fusion after an emotional experience and (2) engage in pro-social self-sacrifice.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e217
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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