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Burt uses a fallacious motte-and-bailey argument to dispute the value of genetics for social science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2023

Brendan P. Zietsch
Affiliation:
Centre for Psychology and Evolution, School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia zietsch@psy.uq.edu.au https://psychology.uq.edu.au/profile/2404/brendan-zietsch
Abdel Abdellaoui
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC - location University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands a.abdelllaoui@amsterdamumc.nl https://researchinformation.amsterdamumc.org/en/persons/abdel-abdellaoui karin.verweij@amsterdamumc.nl https://researchinformation.amsterdamumc.org/en/persons/karin-j-h-verweij
Karin J. H. Verweij
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC - location University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands a.abdelllaoui@amsterdamumc.nl https://researchinformation.amsterdamumc.org/en/persons/abdel-abdellaoui karin.verweij@amsterdamumc.nl https://researchinformation.amsterdamumc.org/en/persons/karin-j-h-verweij

Abstract

Burt's argument relies on a motte-and-bailey fallacy. Burt aims to argue against the value of genetics for social science; instead she argues against certain interpretations of a specific kind of genetics tool, polygenic scores (PGSs). The limitations, previously identified by behavioural geneticists including ourselves, do not negate the value of PGSs, let alone genetics in general, for social science.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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