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Shared intentionality shapes humans' technical know-how

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 August 2020

Henrike Moll Open the ORCID record for Henrike Moll [Opens in a new window] ,
Ryan Nichols  and
Ellyn Pueschel
Henrike Moll
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA90089hmoll@usc.edu
Ryan Nichols
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, California State University Fullerton, Fullerton, CA92831.
Ellyn Pueschel
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA90089hmoll@usc.edu
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Abstract

Osiurak and Reynaud argue that cumulative technological culture is made possible by a “non-social cognitive structure” (sect. 1, para. 1) and they offer an account that aims “to escape from the social dimension” (sect. 1, para. 2) of human cognition. We challenge their position by arguing that human technical rationality is unintelligible outside of our species' uniquely social form of life, which is defined by shared intentionality (Kern & Moll 2017, Philosophical Psychology30(3):319–37; Tomasello 2019a, Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press).

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e172
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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