This paper discusses several philosophical problems with the use of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) in psychotherapy outcome research. The problems include: the impermanence problem, the identification problem, and idiographic problems. The paper concludes with an assessment of the overall case for and against the use of RCTs in psychotherapy outcome research.

Von Neumann argued by means of a thought experiment involving measurements of spin observables that the quantum mechanical quantity$S_{VN}=-k\mathrm{Tr}\,(\rho \mathrm{log}\,\rho) $ is conceptually equivalent to thermodynamic entropy. We analyze Von Neumann's thought experiment and show that his argument fails.

Scientists can choose different claims as interpretations of the results of their research. Scientific rhetoric is understood as the attempt to make those claims most beneficial for the scientists’ interests. A rational choice, game-theoretic model is developed to analyze how this choice can be made and to assess it from a normative point of view. The main conclusion is that ‘social’ interests (pursuit of recognition) may conflict with ‘cognitive’ ones when no constraints are put on the choices of the authors of scientific papers, as in an ‘ideal free speech situation’. Scientific institutions may help to solve this conflict. Lastly, some empirical predictions are offered that can inspire future social research of the refereeing process.

In Science, Truth, and Democracy, Philip Kitcher challenges the view that science has a single, context-independent, goal, and that the pursuit of this goal is essentially immune from moral critique. He substitutes a context-dependent account of science's goal, and shows that this account subjects science to moral evaluation. I argue that Kitcher's approach must be modified, as his account of science ultimately must be explicated in terms of moral concepts. I attempt, therefore, to give an account of science's goal that is free of direct moral entanglements but still makes this goal context-dependent and leaves the choice of which projects to pursue subject to moral scrutiny.

A phenomenological community is an identifiable assemblage of organisms in a local habitat patch: a local wetland or mudflat are typical examples. Such communities are typically persistent: membership and abundance stay fairly constant over time. In this paper I discuss whether phenomenological communities are functionally structured, causal systems that play a role in determining the presence and abundance of organisms in a local habitat patch. I argue they are not, if individualist models of community assembly are vindicated; i.e., if the presence of one species is not typically explained by the presence or absence of specific other species. I discuss two alternatives to individualism, and conclude by arguing for a dimensional model of phenomenological communities. The causal salience of a phenomenological community depends on three factors: the extent to which it is internally regulated, the extent to which it has robust boundaries, and the extent to which it has emergent properties. I conclude by using this model to frame a natural research agenda for community ecology.

David Buller's recent book, Adapting Minds, is a philosophical critique of the field of evolutionary psychology. Buller argues that evolutionary psychology is utterly bankrupt from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Although Adapting Minds has been well received in both the academic press and the popular media, we argue that Buller's critique of evolutionary psychology fails.