In the post-Brexit world it is generally considered that parliamentary sovereignty is the ultimate Grundnorm of the English/United Kingdom sovereignty. The author contends that this truism is largely borne out by recent decisions of the UK Supreme Court in a series of major constitutional cases (Gina Miller (No 2), Privacy International, Scottish Independence Bill and Re Allister and Peeple’s Application). Yet two of these decision (Gina Miller (No 2) and Privacy International) show that the position is slightly more nuanced than this. The latter case shows that the UK courts will not give effect in practice to legislation which ousts the general judicial review power of the High Court. It is also possible that Gina Miller (No 2) will over time lay the foundation for a new Grundnorm whereby the UK courts can review executive decisions on the ground that they are inconsistent with a higher norm of fundamental democratic principles. By contrast, the Irish example shows in one way how far Ireland has travelled from its original common law constitutional roots. The existence of a Kelsenian-style written constitution with a defined hierarchy of norms and system and an express system of judicial review of legislation has over time produced very different methods of judicial thinking and reasoning, so that popular – and not parliamentary – sovereignty view of the referendum process is now the ultimate Grundnorm in the Irish constitutional system.

Prevailing wisdom suggests that sentencing guidelines may constrain judicial discretion and hinder individualised justice; however, our cross-jurisdictional analysis indicates that they might actually better protect these principles than unrestricted discretion. Utilising two large-scale datasets from England and Wales, and Hong Kong, we examine sentences for burglary, assault, and drug trafficking. The results reveal a paradox: guidelines in England and Wales contributed to greater consistency in retributive proportionality and enhanced consideration of personal mitigating factors. Conversely, Hong Kong’s discretionary approach resulted in inconsistent application of sentencing considerations and personal mitigating factors. Both systems prioritised procedural efficiency, with guilty pleas markedly reducing sentences across various offences. These findings challenge the ‘bias effect’ critique by demonstrating that well-structured guidelines can safeguard individualised justice better than unfettered discretion can. The study offers robust empirical evidence for institutional design in criminal justice systems.

This paper offers a novel conceptual framework for understanding fraud in the digital era by introducing the idea of industrialised fraud. Unlike existing literature that focuses on the mechanics of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent fraud, this work situates fraud within the social, structural, technological and economic transformations of the digitalised economy. It argues that fraud is no longer an outlier but a systemic feature of unregulated digital markets, operating at scale and across borders. Through the analytical lenses of fraud’s footholds and fraud’s lifecycles, the paper reexamines fraud’s core legal and moral norms – means, purposes and fault. It demonstrates how they are being reshaped by the transactional contexts in which fraud is now designed, facilitated and perpetrated. This reconceptualisation provides a firmer foundation for principled debate on fraud governance and criminalisation in an era of rapid technological transformation.

This paper explores the interplay between intellectual property and gender in modern design law and practice, with a focus on the New Zealand Designs Act 1953 and references to Australian, United Kingdom and European Union law. It highlights how law and practice favour technical, utilitarian design principles (that coded masculine), but neglect the dynamic, sensory and affective (embodied and emotive) aspects of designs (that coded feminine). Through its focus on the technical, design law and practice ignore the socio-legal reality that the dynamic, sensory and affective are often central to a design’s success. The paper frames the foregoing in standpoint theory and affect. It challenges the focus on that which can be reduced to technical-based representation and the perception that this creates an objective master copy. The paper calls for a reassessment of what design law protects and how it protects it, to better align the system with the socio-legal realities of design creation and use.

Despite the Supreme Court ruling on the matter in July 2023, the correct test for police misconduct for use of force (the use of force test) in England and Wales remains contested. This paper explores how the largely subjective criminal law test preferred by police stakeholders is inconsistent with addressing the institutional racism within the Metropolitan Police highlighted in the Casey Review. In doing so, it makes a novel contribution to police accountability debates by developing a new analytical framework which allows arguments concerning police accountability processes to be more clearly articulated and assessed. The framework envisages three axes of accountability. The conduct axis relates to the actual levels of force used against citizens. The cultural axis concerns the extent to which police accountability processes provide meaningful oversight of police managers and professional standards departments, while the constitutional axis is engaged with the balance of power at the various parts of the police accountability system. Plotting the relative impact of more subjective or objective use of force tests along each axis allows clarity of debate concerning the consequences of the preferred test and thereby highlights the mitigation necessary in relation to the negative consequences of a choice in either direction.

The application of a contract involves ascertaining whether the components of a contract term are met on the facts. It is a matter of categorisation or classification. There are at least three methods of categorisation: by criteria; by factor-balancing; and by analogy. The process of application is distinct from the processes that are engaged to define contract terms, including in particular interpretation. However, both the process of application and the process of interpretation address problems of linguistic indeterminacy, that is, cases where the words do not fit the facts. And these problems are usually resolved through interpretation; the relevant term is defined with such specificity that it is clear how it is to be applied. It is only when the court cannot define the term precisely that the court engages in categorisation or classification in a complex and meaningful way.

This paper assesses the effectiveness of current legal standards in resolving rights-based disputes arising from compulsory curricula in schools, an issue of growing significance as such teaching expands in the areas of sexuality, relationship and religious education. Focusing on Article 2 of Protocol 1 (P1-2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), it critiques the current reliance on the ‘objective, critical, and pluralistic’ (OCP) standard, examining its alignment with the core purpose of P1-2: preventing state monopolisation in education through safeguarding qualified parental choice. The analysis identifies shortcomings in P1-2 case law, particularly the subjective nature of determining when teaching is OCP, the negation of parental objections and the neglect of children’s rights in the assessment process. To address these issues, the paper proposes a revised review framework which prioritises a justification test that recognises parental concerns, reduces reliance on public interest justifications and acknowledges the legitimacy of children’s rights as grounds for limiting parental objections. The paper argues that this refined approach better aligns with the article’s foundational purpose whilst fostering an enlarged space for the balanced consideration of competing interests and rights in educational controversies.

Hate crime legislation was introduced in Ireland for the first time in 2024 through the Criminal Justice (Hate Offences) Act 2024. The Irish legislation draws heavily on the Scottish Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021 and uses both the ‘motivation test’ and ‘demonstration test’ for establishing liability. We explore how the demonstration test might be interpreted in Ireland given the absence of a stated mens rea in the legislation to accompany the actus reus of demonstrating hatred. We explore whether a mens rea is necessary in the operative part of legislation through the lens of recent Irish case law on the issue, examine analagous case law from Britain, and ask whether the 2024 Act can withstand judicial scrutiny.

The UK Supreme Court has recently clarified the principle of bad faith in UK trade mark law in the case of SkyKick UK Ltd v Sky Ltd.1 This commentary examines the UK Supreme Court’s approach and provides a brief analysis of its implications on UK trade mark applications made for defensive purposes.

The Irish Supreme Court’s decision in Kelly v UCD1 is a significant ruling on judicial bias and disqualification. It is the first case to consider the implications of familial connections between judges and law firms representing parties since the Judicial Conduct Committee published its Guidelines on Judicial Conduct and Ethics in 2022.2 The case clarifies the legal test for objective bias, delineates its boundaries, and addresses the role of judicial conduct guidelines in disqualification decisions. It also has broader implications for other common law jurisdictions, particularly England & Wales, where similar issues of judicial propriety and public confidence in impartial adjudication arise.