Empirical literature regarding which actors support the most participatory democracy is surprisingly scarce. Discussing the core ideological features of populist and post-materialist-centred parties, we expect that these parties emphasise participatory democracy more than their competitors. Additionally, populist parties should embody a monist demand for greater participatory democracy, while post-materialist-centred (PMC) parties should advocate a pluralist understanding of it. Drawing on party electoral manifestos, we verify these assumptions in several national elections across Europe. Our findings show mixed support for the theoretical expectations. Both post-materialist and populist parties support participatory democracy more than other parties, and their principles diverge. More precisely, our data confirm that PMC parties advocate a pluralist understanding of participatory democracy. Yet populist parties show a fuzzier picture. While populist radical right parties exhibit a monist profile, radical left populist parties are much more in line with post-materialist arguments.

In democracies, elections in which voters elect their leaders and hold them accountable are the most important part of the democratic process. This study is about the people who work on the frontline of democracy and who play a major role in elections, namely poll workers. Surprisingly little is known about how poll workers evaluate elections, and we provide a detailed analysis of poll workers' views of how elections work in Sweden. We do this by reporting and analysing the results from a survey conducted among poll workers in Sweden shortly after the 2022 election. The results show that although many types of polling station-related problems were rare, some problems occurred to a greater extent than we expected. It is also clear that many of the problems had a negative impact on the poll workers' evaluations of the quality of the voting process.

The current study followed the need for more research concerning the understanding of the relationship between simulation design and self-efficacy in negotiating development within role-play simulations of political decision-making. More specifically, the purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship of social persuasion as a source for self-efficacy in negotiating with simulation design elements. The research was conducted in a three-day simulation about the EU decision-making process. By means of daily diaries and semi-structured interviews, critical incidents about the emergence of social persuasion influencing self-efficacy development were defined. Data were analysed by applying thematic content analysis. Findings show that social persuasion was largely facilitated by the simulation design that offered possibilities for informal contact.

Altmetrics are an emerging form of bibliometric measurement that capture the online dimension of scholarly exchange. Against the backdrop of both a higher education landscape increasingly focused on quantifying research productivity and impact, as well as literature emphasising the need to address gender bias in the discipline, we consider whether and how altmetrics (re)produce gendered dynamics in political science. Using a novel dataset on the Altmetric Attention Scores (AAS) of political science research, we investigate two questions: Do AAS vary by gender? And how do AAS relate to gendered social media dynamics? We find that AAS reproduce gendered dynamics found in disciplinary publication and citation practices. For example, journal articles authored exclusively by female scholars score 27% lower on average than exclusively male-authored outputs. However, men are also more likely to write articles with an AAS of zero. These patterns are shaped by the presence of high-scoring male “superstars” whose research attracts much online attention. Complementing existing scholarship, we show that the AAS closely overlaps with virality dynamics on Twitter. We suggest that these gendered dynamics may be hidden behind the seemingly neutral, technical character of altmetrics, which is worrisome where they are used to evaluate scholarship.

This research note presents the RepResent Belgian Panel (RBP). The RBP is a voter panel survey consisting of four waves fielded to a sample of voters in Belgium around the May 2019 federal, regional, and European elections in Belgium. It provides unique data on about 250 variables for a quota sample of the same respondents, pre-2019 elections (N = 7351), post-2019 elections (N = 3909), one year after the elections (N = 1996), and 2 years after the elections (N = 1119). The RBP panel dataset was designed to analyse voters’ political attitudes and behaviours, notably on different dimensions of democratic representation, and with a specific focus on democratic resentment (e.g. citizens’ attitudes towards democracy such as distrust and alienation, but also behaviours such as abstention, protest, or voting for anti-establishment parties). Its longitudinal structure allows to explore the political dynamics at play in Belgium throughout the lengthy government formation process. Finally, the last two waves of the RBP were fielded during the Covid-19 pandemic, allowing to explore public opinion before and during this global crisis. The RBP should be of interest to scholars of public opinion and electoral studies.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused a seemingly high level of unity amongst Europeans in support of Ukraine. However, this article uncovers some inter- and intra-country fault-lines in public opinion across and within 16 EU countries and the UK regarding pro-Ukraine aid initiatives by using a two-wave design with data from the EUI-YouGov survey conducted in April and September 2022. Findings show that support is relatively stable but varies a lot depending on the specific measure and between countries. We uncover lowest support for measures that go against the self-interest of Europeans such as deploying troops and accepting higher energy costs. Frontrunners of Ukraine support are geographically close to Russia and located in both Western and Eastern Europe (though not exclusively), whereas laggards are countries of Eastern and Southern Europe with a history of Russian ties during the Cold War. Yet within countries, Ukraine support does not follow a simple pre-determined ideological pattern of the left and right. Most countries with lower overall support for Ukraine display a higher level of polarization between supporters of the incumbent versus the opposition party. Understanding these fault-lines is important for insights on current and future levels of Ukraine aid across Europe.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the grounds behind Vladimir Putin’s decision were widely debated. Theories suggest several reasons, including Putin’s nostalgic dream of restoring Soviet imperial glory, Russia’s fears of NATO security threats near their borders. But another explanation may be more prosaic: Putin’s desire to restore his sagging popularity at home by attempting to repeat his 2014 “Crimea” strategy. By annexing territories in Eastern Ukraine, he may have hoped to generate a “rally-around-the flag” effect, boosting his domestic support by appealing to Russian patriotism and nationalism. To examine this thesis, Part I outlines the core concept and what is known in the literature about the size and duration of the rally-around-the flag phenomenon. Part II examines the available time-series survey evidence drawn from a variety of opinion polls in Ukraine, Europe, and Russia focusing on the first 8 months of the war to detect any rally effects associated with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Part III examines the evidence of media effects. Part IV adds robustness tests. The conclusion in Part V summarizes the main findings and discusses their broader implications for understanding the roots of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its consequences.