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Group myths can create shared understanding even if they don't act as superstimuli

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2025

Moshe Hoffman Open the ORCID record for Moshe Hoffman [Opens in a new window]  and
Cristina Moya
Moshe Hoffman*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Boston College, Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA hoffman.moshe@gmail.com; https://sites.google.com/site/hoffmanmoshe/
Cristina Moya
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Davis, CA, USA moya@ucdavis.edu; https://sites.google.com/site/cristinasolermoya/
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Sijilmassi et al. argue that myths around shared ancestry and history exploit an evolved psychology of interdependence. In contrast, we argue that psychological exploitation is not required. Rather, such myths may be one method, among many, to create a shared understanding of group boundaries, which can be “self-enforcing.” We summarize the game-theoretic basis for this account and some supportive evidence.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e181
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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