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Myth as model: Group-level interpretive frameworks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2025

Cody Moser Open the ORCID record for Cody Moser [Opens in a new window]
Cody Moser*
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, CA, USA cmoser2@ucmerced.edu https://culturologies.co/
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

I argue that while recruitment might explain some of the design features of historical myths, origin myths in general more importantly provide shared narrative frameworks for aligning and coordinating members of a group. Furthermore, by providing in-group members with shared frameworks for interfacing with the world, the contents of myths likely facilitate the selection of belief systems at the group-level.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e185
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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