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The four different modes of psychological explanation, and their proper evaluative schemas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2022

Michael Gilead*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 8410501, Israel. michael.gilead@gmail.com

Abstract

I apply Benjamin's (1941) taxonomy of common scientific “modes of explanation” to the psychological context. I argue that: (i) in a “naming” mode, generalizability is not necessary; (ii) in an “analysis,” generalizability is desired; (iii) in a “causal ontology,” generalizability is merely one of the means to an end (theory-challenge); (iv) in a “synthesis,” generalizability is (eventually) critical. A better appreciation of the diversity in psychologists' modes of explanation is crucial for cogent meta-psychological discussions.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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