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We need to think more about how we conduct research

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2022

Gerd Gigerenzer Open the ORCID record for Gerd Gigerenzer [Opens in a new window]
Gerd Gigerenzer*
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany. gigerenzer@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
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Abstract

Research practice is too often shaped by routines rather than reflection. The routine of sampling subjects, but not stimuli, is a case in point, leading to unwarranted generalizations. It likely originated out of administrative rather than scientific concerns. The routine of sampling subjects and testing their averages for significance is reinforced by delusions about its meaningfulness, including the replicability delusion.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e16
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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