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The familiar appeal of imaginary worlds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2022

Andrew Shtulman Open the ORCID record for Andrew Shtulman [Opens in a new window]
Andrew Shtulman*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA 90041, USA shtulman@oxy.edu
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Abstract

Imaginary worlds may satisfy our need to explore, but it's an open question what we are searching for. Research on imagination suggests that if we are searching for something extraordinary – something that violates our intuitions about real-world causality – then we seek it in small doses and in contexts that ultimately confirm our intuitions. Imaginary worlds allow for true novelty, but we may actually prefer ideas that are novel on their surface but familiar at their core.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e298
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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