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Meta-ethical pluralism: A cautionary tale about cohesive moral communities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2015

Jennifer Cole Wright
Jennifer Cole Wright*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC 29412. wrightjj1@cofc.edu http://wrightjj1.people.cofc.edu
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Abstract

Meta-ethical pluralism gives us additional insight into how moral communities become cohesive and why this can be problematic (even dangerous) – and in this way provides support for the worries raised by the target article. At the same time, it offers several reasons to be concerned about the proposed initiative, the most important of which is that it could seriously backfire.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 38 , 2015 , e163
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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