As the risk of climate overshoot grows, attention increasingly turns to climate interventions, that is technologies designed to actively alter the climate system beyond conventional mitigation and adaptation. The article addresses questions of institutional legitimacy and recognition justice, the implications of international legal fragmentation, competing approaches to risk analysis, the application of precautionary and prevention principles, market governance of CDR, the role of intellectual property regimes, and regional perspectives. The most striking tension revolves around the question of how risks should be analysed and compared. Climate intervention governance does not exist in a vacuum but is an emerging field shaped by partial institutional coverage, normative contestation, and private-sector acceleration against a background of limited public salience. This article situates climate intervention governance within broader debates on risk regulation. Building on and critically synthesising the contributions published in the European Journal of Risk Regulation’s Special Issue devoted to the governance challenges posed by Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), the article identifies cross-cutting themes that will shape governance debates in the coming years. It concludes that climate intervention governance is ultimately a test case for contemporary risk analysis and regulation and collective self-governance, under conditions of radical uncertainty.

Research into solar radiation modification (SRM) offers tentative hope of averting some of the risks of otherwise unavoidable climate change. Yet such technologies come with novel risks. Risk–risk, or risk trade-off analysis has been proposed as a governance tool to evaluate the desirability of development of such potential climate interventions, but most references to such analysis appear primarily as rhetorical efforts to argue for continued SRM research. A detailed review of the leading methodological proposal reveals serious practical and ethical shortcomings arising in both the framing and current methodologies of risk-risk analysis. Methodological inconsistencies and asymmetries are identified, and related to underlying political and ideological presumptions rooted in modernist technocratic social imaginaries. The shortcomings mean ethical questions are not resolved, interaction effects between possible responses are downplayed and other potential exceptional responses ignored. Rather than identifying possible risk-superior pathways, in this case risk-tradeoff analysis – embedded in a technocratic risk management repertoire – seems likely to encourage excessive reliance on SRM. While methodological improvements could be made to risk–risk analysis approaches, effective future governance urgently needs a novel, genuinely precautionary, risk management repertoire that would help humanity live with uncertainty, support meaningful action to avoid worst-case outcomes, and reflect an ethics of care.

This article considers the application of the precautionary principle as understood in EU law to EU decision-making on geoengineering, in particular solar geoengineering. It finds that the situation is riddled with more complexities than first appears; (i) the principle is used to argue against research, even though more research is usually itself seen as precautionary response; (ii) the risks of research are claimed to lie in its political impact, whereas the principle is traditionally applied to direct physical risks; (iii) while there are legitimate precautionary arguments against geoengineering, it is itself put forward as a precautionary measure and there are precautionary arguments in favour too. Drawing on case law and scholarship we conclude that the precautionary principle can nevertheless be applied and will lead to a procedural requirement to do comprehensive reviews of relevant scientific knowledge before decision-making. This leaves wide – but not unbounded – discretion but may still be valuable in providing a frame for reasoned public debate. We also apply our findings to the recent expert reports on Solar Radiation Modification and show that they have failed to apply precaution correctly.

Targeted policy and governance instruments are essential for developing a carbon dioxide removal (CDR) sector aligned with climate change mitigation scenarios. As a result, a large share of the scientific literature on CDR concentrates on these aspects. However, current CDR deployment and development are mainly driven by private organisations. While their role in CDR governance is generally acknowledged, important context regarding their perspectives, motivations and decision-making processes is lacking. This study addresses this gap by conducting seventy-nine interviews with senior representatives from organisations engaged in the early CDR market, including technology suppliers, credit purchasers, and financiers. We explore their views on key components of fair and equitable CDR systems. Our analysis reveals varying priorities across interviewed actors, including strong regulatory frameworks, market transparency, accountability, funding mechanisms and (climate) justice, emphasising historical responsibility, revenue distribution and community engagement. Additionally, we identify conflicting perspectives on the involvement of oil and gas sectors and the balance between rapid scale-up and thorough, inclusive processes. This research offers critical insights into the role of private organisations in shaping the governance of the emerging CDR sector, highlighting the complex interplay of market dynamics and ethical considerations.

Solar radiation modification (SRM) presents important challenges to risk regulation and governance, arising from the array of multiple risks that SRM may influence. SRM would not simply reverse climate change, but could pose further ancillary impacts, depending on the method of SRM, such as stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), marine cloud brightening (MCB), or a space-based planetary sunshade system (PSS). We identify multiple risks that SRM may influence, both biophysical and sociopolitical, to be compared to the multiple risks that may be affected by greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation and climate adaptation. This multi-risk framework helps analysts and decision makers identify, evaluate, and compare multiple risks holistically; helps identify affected groups to overcome problems of disregard and omitted voice; helps compare policy options and map the array of risks to corresponding (or missing) governance mechanisms; and seeks risk-superior policies that would reduce multiple risks in concert. We then examine governance frameworks: uncoordinated, coordinated and comprehensive. We suggest two key mechanisms that can help build up from uncoordinated toward more coordinated or even comprehensive approaches, and that can gain support from SRM advocates, observers and critics alike: a series of international assessments of SRM, and a transparent international monitoring system for SRM.

With major US scientific institutions supporting a program of solar geoengineering research, the UK’s ARIA agency actively pursuing open air experimentation, and the EU in the process of clarifying its position, the question of how such research should be governed has been given new urgency. This paper argues that innovation in the structures and procedures of existing institutions for the oversight of scientific research is highly desirable, to promote the level of legitimacy, procedural justice, and recognition to which recent major proposed research governance frameworks aspire. First, we argue that SRM research is importantly dissimilar from climate research, but bears more similarity to other high-risk research areas, implying the need for special institutional arrangements. Second, we identify the special challenges of legitimacy–particularly its procedural justice component–with respect to the potential global, intergenerational and cross-community scope of legitimation requirements. Third, we argue that achieving legitimacy and procedural justice in the context of SRM research governance must include considerations of justice as recognition. Finally, we consider the institutional implications of legitimate and recognition-inclusive SRM research institutions.

This article examines the role of customary international law in regulating SRM by analysing competing interpretations of the customary law principle of prevention and their implications for SRM governance. Existing customary law limitations are largely overlooked in current policy and expert discussions around the future of SRM, which seemingly proceed on the basis that there are no universally applicable limitations for states to develop SRM technologies should they decide so. The paper contrasts this view and argues, from a positivist point of view, that the customary principle of prevention does pose certain limits for states even before SRM-caused transboundary environmental harm occurs. It distinguishes between a retrospective and future-oriented dimension of the prevention principle, and it depicts three scenarios for how the prevention obligation may limit the development and deployment of SRM technology depending on how States (and international legal advisors) conceptualise the temporal scope and normative content of the prevention principle. The article also examines the implications of the different configurations of the customary law obligation for an eventual SRM treaty.

A widely made claim in academic scholarship is that the governance of solar geoengineering is characterised by gaps in international law and the absence of regulatory mechanisms. This article presents a more nuanced perspective on this claim. Instead of focusing on one comprehensive regime to govern solar geoengineering (whether its use or its non-use), we adopt a multi-dimensional impact approach to consideration of solar radiation modification (SRM) technologies and their governance. We outline the diverse array of adverse impacts that any SRM governance regime would need to contend with, and map how many of these impacts fall within the purview of existing international institutions and obligations. We conclude that any future SRM governance regime would need to build upon or at least not contravene these existing obligations. While our analysis thus modifies the claim of gaps in international law relating to SRM governance, it also suggests that the fragmented yet comprehensive coverage of diverse impacts does not mean that global coordination to govern deployment of SRM is already in place. Instead, the fragmented web of institutions and principles that exists provides room largely for restrictive SRM governance, in order to prevent adverse impacts within core areas of concern.

In an interview with Jonas Salk, the inventor of the first polio vaccine, when asked whether he owned the patents for the vaccine, Salk replied with a rhetorical question: “Could you patent the sun?” Decades later, patents about the Sun indeed emerged as solar radiation modification (SRM) technologies advanced. The current international legal system does not preclude the patenting of SRM technologies, primarily on the basis of the principle of technology neutrality in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Since SRM has inherent dual effects – its potential benefits in helping reduce climate risk coexist with significant potential risks, including environmental harm and governance challenges. Risk regulation may require the exclusion of patents for certain SRM technologies. This article examines the potential grounds and current proposals to prohibit patents on certain SRM technologies, and the challenges these proposals may face under the principle of technology neutrality under the TRIPS Agreement. It then seeks to overcome the challenges by proposing to incorporate ex ante risk considerations into the patent system, which could be best implemented through a sui generis regulatory framework for SRM regulation that includes a prohibition on SRM patents.

Global discussions around the risks, benefits and governance of solar radiation modification (SRM) in the climate change response portfolio are accelerating, but the topic remains nascent in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In 2023, a US start-up (Make Sunsets) performed a small-scale, non-research deployment of SRM in Baja California, Mexico, without prior permission or community engagement. Their actions prompted Mexico to announce its intention to ban SRM experimentation, underscoring the need for governance to prevent irresponsible practices that could discredit legitimate research. We perform an empirical and ethical analysis of the landscape of academic discussions and media coverage on SRM in the LAC region, focusing on the Make Sunset case. Our analysis leads us to three conclusions: first, a lack of regulations in LAC that fosters mistrust, fuels perceptions of neo-colonialism and restricts potentially valuable and responsible research; second, we argue that the theatrical Make Sunsets case is not ethically justified in light of the diversity of risks associated with it; third, we offer foundational, participatory recommendations to promote effective, transparent and sustainable governance of SRM, including LAC in global conversations.

The green transition promoted by the European Green Deal (EGD) is not simply a matter of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. This macro-objective enshrined in European Climate Law (ECL) is complemented by the objectives of zero pollution and ecological resilience. These three intertwined objectives further manifest themselves in a myriad of sub-objectives, which are to be achieved through an array of interconnected regulatory and financial measures falling with the scope of energy, industrial, transport, external trade, agricultural and environmental policies. The genius of the EGD reform lies precisely in the fact that it articulates a number of complementary objectives whilst also operating within the framework of several EU policies. The aim of this article is to assess whether the 160 legislative instruments implementing the EGD amount to greenwashing of EU economic policies or whether they are in actual fact testament to a paradigm shift. This issue is all the more topical now that several simplification proposals have been proposed by the European Commission.

The key requirement for GMO authorisation is the submission of analytical methods for the detection, identification and quantification (DIQ), which has proven challenging in the case of New Genomic Techniques (NGTs). Currently available non-analytical approaches, such as blockchain traceability and probabilistic analysis, while potentially useful for monitoring, are insufficient for authorisation purposes. The lack of reliable DIQ methods hinders the authorisation of NGT products and raises concerns for both organic and conventional agriculture, where the presence of NGT products goes undetected. Therefore, the existing GMO regulatory framework requires reevaluation to address the challenges posed by NGTs while ensuring compliance with the broader EU food law framework.

The Digital Services Act (Regulation 2022/2065, “DSA”) creates a new national administrative authority to enforce the DSA across member states: the Digital Services Coordinator (“DSC”). DSCs perform a linchpin role in the DSA enforcement. DSCs have a number of tasks that interact with the content moderation process, such as certifying trusted flaggers or participating in drafting codes of conduct. They also have significant investigatory- and sanctioning powers to enforce the DSA vis-à-vis platforms, shaping content moderation processes and protecting users’ rights against platform misconduct. These interactions with content moderation affect users’ freedom of expression. This contribution scrutinises the role of the DSC in light of that freedom, describing how DSCs shape freedom of expression online through their powers in the DSA, and identifying instances where exercise of DSA powers can lead to different levels of protection for freedom of expression across Member States in the decentralised enforcement network. Finally, it proposes avenues in the DSA to anchor protection of freedom of expression in the application of the DSA by DSCs, through pursuing centralisation in cases with significant fundamental rights impact, and encouraging better usage of guideline competencies.

Exposure to endocrine disrupting chemicals is linked to negative health impacts, including non-communicable diseases such as obesity, cardiovascular diseases and cancer. This disease burden compromises consumer safety and costs the European Union an estimated €163 billion per year. Given these stakes, the importance of effectively regulating EDCs in food is paramount. Yet regulators face difficult challenges: scientific uncertainty, the ubiquity of EDCs in food products, and pressure from economic and political interests all complicate legislative responses. From a risk regulation perspective, the core problem is how to protect public health from EDC risks in food amidst these uncertainties and constraints. This paper addresses the problem by examining the current EU regulatory framework for managing EDCs in the food supply chain, identifying gaps and weaknesses, and proposing improvements to better safeguard public health. From this risk regulation perspective, the paper highlights the benefits of ensuring regulatory action keeps pace with scientific evidence, leveraging the General Food Law Regulation for a comprehensive approach to EDCs, and developing sector-specific EDC regulation across the food supply chain.

Technology neutrality is a guiding principle of the European Union’s technology regulation, stating that legislation should not favour or discriminate against any particular technology, but rather focus on the effects or functions of technologies broadly. This article examines the principle as a way to future-proof regulation by allowing legislation to adapt to the changes in technology over time. Effects of technology neutrality have not been sufficiently analysed in the novel context of regulation of artificial intelligence, which arguably poses more significant societal risks than telecommunications, where the principle first evolved. To address this gap in research, this article analyses whether the technology neutral nature of the EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) renders it more future-proof. It identifies three main factors that affect future-proofness of the AI Act in light of technology neutrality: definition of AI, the risk-based approach and its enforcement mechanisms. The findings indicate that the AI Act’s deviations from technology neutrality, including specific provisions for general-purpose AI models significantly improved its scope and future-proofness. Thus, technology neutrality and future-proof regulation should not be treated synonymously, and strict adherence to neutrality may even obscure the political choices and democratic agency essential for AI regulation.

The concept of identifiability remains a foundational yet contentious criterion in European Union (EU) data protection law. Similarly, anonymisation has sparked intense debate.

This paper examines recent developments that have shaped the EU’s approaches to identifiability and anonymisation, including trends in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law, national supervisory authority (SA) assessments of anonymisation processes, and the recent European Data Protection Board (EDPB) Opinion 28/2024 addressing the anonymity of artificial intelligence models and EDPB Guidelines 01/2025 on pseudonymisation.

The paper explores how the balance between over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness is being calibrated, suggesting the emergence of a functional definition of personal data in CJEU case law. It underscores the importance of the burden of proof in evaluating anonymisation processes, as confirmed by national SA assessments. Finally, it highlights how to ensure consistency between the GDPR and data sharing mandates stemming from the new generation of EU data regulations.

This study analyses the regulation of “heterogeneous products”—those incorporating interdisciplinary technologies subject to multiple agencies and regulations. Despite recognising the need for coordinated regulatory approaches, no systematic frameworks exist. We developed a framework to analyse both heterogeneous product composition and corresponding regulatory design, exploring their interrelationships. Applying this to case studies of vertical takeoff and landing and roadable aircraft, we found that regulatory interpretations of similar product characteristics varied, leading to differing regulatory responses. Our findings demonstrate a strong link between product classification and applicable regulations, highlighting the importance of considering both concurrently when designing new products or regulations.

The European Union is a world leader in nanotechnology environmental, health and safety (EHS) risk regulation, and since its policy integration has been increasingly active in promoting international coordination and cooperation on nanotechnology risk governance. What affects its ability to influence nanotechnology risk regulation and governance internationally? This analysis focuses on the European Union (EU) level arguing that the EU’s scientific and regulatory capacities have significant explanatory power. Empirically, the article examines three cases of EU influence in key areas of international nanotechnology risk regulation and governance – nanosafety research for regulatory purpose, science diplomacy, and multilateral risk governance, following its integrated policy.

This article examines the evolution of insurance contract law reforms, focusing on the shift towards a more policyholder-friendly approach to disclosure duties in some Civil Law and Common Law countries. Traditionally, insurance law favoured insurers, but recent reforms have increasingly prioritised consumer protection by adopting inquiry-based disclosure and restricting insurers’ rights to void contracts for non-disclosure. Through a comparative analysis, this article examines the alignment between Germany and the UK in reforming disclosure duties, which has driven a broader movement towards policyholder protection. Influenced by these developments, legal reforms in various jurisdictions have enhanced transparency and fairness by reducing policyholders’ disclosure burdens while increasing insurers’ responsibilities. As the insurance landscape evolves, ongoing legal reforms must prioritise policyholder protection, addressing emerging challenges from digitalisation and technological innovation, with this shift towards policyholders set to become the leading force in shaping a more equitable, consumer-centric regulatory framework.

This paper examines the legal implications of the explicit mentioning of automation bias (AB) in the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). The AIA mandates human oversight for high-risk AI systems and requires providers to enable awareness of AB, i.e., the human tendency to over-rely on AI outputs. The paper analyses the embedding of this extra-juridical concept in the AIA, the asymmetric division of responsibility between AI providers and deployers for mitigating AB, and the challenges of legally enforcing this novel awareness requirement. The analysis shows that the AIA’s focus on providers does not adequately address design and context as causes of AB, and questions whether the AIA should directly regulate the risk of AB rather than just mandating awareness. As the AIA’s approach requires a balance between legal mandates and behavioural science, the paper proposes that harmonised standards should reference the state of research on AB and human-AI interaction, holding both providers and deployers accountable. Ultimately, further empirical research on human-AI interaction will be essential for effective safeguards.