The Russian presence in Syria and the Middle East also has its domestic dimension. In September 2016, Russia is expected to hold its Parliamentary elections. Under these circumstances, it has, at least, to give the impression of the troops’ withdrawal from Syria. Otherwise the fact of Moscow's military presence in Syria might be used by the opposition to draw parallels between the Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan that also started as a short-term operation aimed at the support of a regime loyal to Moscow. This, in turn, could have a negative effect on the level of public support for pro-Putin candidates. At the same time, the Russian authorities have never clearly stated their final goals in Syria. Consequently, this approach allows official propaganda to present any (even small) achievements as examples of the successful completion of military operations. This, in turn, would definitely have a positive effect on Russian public opinion.

It could be argued that if there was no Middle Eastern region with all its dramatic problems then Moscow would have to invent it. Currently, the Russian propaganda machine is actively exploiting regional issues to shape public opinion inside the country. Unexpectedly, the Middle East offered the Kremlin a very convenient prism through which to position itself in Russian public opinion on a number of vital issues such as the legitimacy of the regime, its confrontation with the West and the situation in Ukraine. As a result, for the last three years, the Middle Eastern problem has become one of the most popular topics discussed by Russian media sources and politicians.

First of all, the Russian authorities are focusing on Middle Eastern topics in order to shore up the popularity of the regime. In order to achieve this, official propaganda actively appeals to the more nationalistic sentiments of the Russian population. And these appeals find positive feedback. A large part of the mid- and low-layers of the Russian population would like to see Moscow more active in protecting its national interests and cementing relations with the non-Western part of the world. The Kremlin, in turn, gives them what they want. Russian support for Damascus, close relations with Tehran and rapprochement with Egypt are positioned by Moscow officials and Russian media as the restoration of Moscow's influence in the world that was lost after 1991.