Traditionally, Russian foreign policy towards Syria represents a certain enigma for researchers and political analysts. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has never demonstrated such stubbornness in defending its partners in the Middle East as in the case of the Assad regime. During the last four years, international experts have offered a wide array of theories to explain Moscow's relations with Damascus. Thus, in most cases, analysts refer to the close political, military and economic ties existing between Moscow and Damascus. Some of them also point to Russian cultural connections with Syria and the substantial Russian-speaking community living across the country. Most of these assumptions are not without foundation. However, these factors were probably important in 2011 – 2012 but, by 2015, had largely lost their relevance. Moreover, some of them even initially did not have much influence on the situation.

For instance, the factor of the Russian-speaking community has never played a decisive role in Moscow's stance on Syria. First of all, the bulk of the Russian-speaking community in this country was represented by Russian women who married locals, and their children, who could hardly be called a politically influential force. Some of these can hardly speak Russian or speak with a very strong accent. Those Syrians who studied in the USSR or Russia indeed have pro-Russian feelings and formed a certain segment of the Syrian intelligentsia. However, this part of the population was also limited in influence: Hafez Assad was very cautious about communists and leftists. Under these circumstances, the loyalty of the pro-Russian Syrians was periodically questioned by the regime. Bashar Assad also never trusted them and was more oriented to those people who received a Western-style education.

As for the factors of bilateral military and economic ties, they had quite a limited time effect on the Russian position. If, by the beginning of the conflict in 2011, trade cooperation between the two countries was important, the four years of war have changed this by cutting almost all economic ties. Thus, by 2014 bilateral trade fell below $0.4 billion and most investment projects were stopped. In other words, there was nothing left for Russia to defend. The war completely devastated the country's economy. Consequently, Russian companies were to withdraw from Syria and compensate their losses by moving their business to other countries in the region.