2012 onwards has seen as a period of diplomatic activity by the Kremlin in the Middle East which is unprecedented since the fall of the USSR. Existing records of diplomatic and political contacts show an increased exchange of multilevel delegations between Russia and Middle Eastern countries. Moscow is attempting to cultivate deeper involvement in regional issues and to establish contacts with those forces in the region which the Kremlin considers as legitimate. If before 2012 the Kremlin's diplomacy in the Middle East could be characterized as inconsistent and shaped by the opportunism of the Russian authorities, growing confrontation with the West became the factor which impelled Moscow to intensify its activities in the Middle East. All in all, by intensifying its current activities in the region, the Kremlin is pursuing the following three goals:
1. Economic (compensating for the negative effects of sanctions on the Russian economy; securing existing sources of income; protecting the interests of Russian energy companies and their share in the international oil and gas market);
2. Political (avoiding complete international isolation; creating leverage which can be used to affect US and EU behavior; propagandizing Moscow's conception of the “right world order”; shaping Russian popular opinion);
3. Security (reducing potential security threats for Russia and the CIS posed by the situation in the Middle East).
Russian strategy in the Middle East comprises several elements. First, Moscow is persistent in defending what it sees as its red lines in the region. Thus, Russia is against any military intervention not approved by the UNSC or justified by the existing UN norms. It does not welcome forced regime change if it leads to the destruction of existing state mechanisms. The Kremlin is also concerned about any change of borders in the Middle East, and it is firmly against any dialogue with radical Islamists and jihadists. Moscow's flexibility has enabled it to talk to different forces in the region and, if necessary, play the mediator's role. However, Russia is respected by Assad's regional opponents such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar for the stubbornness it demonstrates when defending its own red lines in the region. Accordingly, the Saudis and Qataris are compelled to take Russia's point of view into account and retain some dialogue with the Kremlin.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.